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Present work in the philosophy of chemistry has overlooked a foundational debate among chemists 
about the proper function of chemical concepts. The debate is fueled by a desire to connect 
computational models with traditional chemical concepts, and has divided chemists since the origins 
of quantum chemistry. By analyzing the history of the concepts of electronegativity and the atom in 
the molecule, I show that there are two camps with conflicting priorities. Theorists who favor rigor 
seek concepts that neatly summarize important elements of the underlying physical models. Theorists 
who favor understanding seek concepts that achieve a balance between simplicity and qualitative 
accuracy. The development of concepts for understanding is shown to involve the use of multiple 
quantification schemes in order to achieve consistency with other concepts. This practice might appear 
shortsighted if not for the diverse functionality of the resulting concepts. These concepts can i) help 
discover new reactions and structures, ii) allow comparison of different models in computational 
chemistry, and iii) guide chemists to develop more accurate and more interpretable computational 
models. Finally, it is shown that these conflicting modes of conceptual development have implications 
for the nature of chemical concepts. Chemists on each side of the debate adopt different positions, 
explicitly or tacitly, on reduction, pluralism, and the ontology of chemical concepts. Philosophers of 
chemistry who neglect this debate cannot responsibly interpret chemists’ statements on these issues. 
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This dissertation is about a foundational debate in chemistry that has divided chemists into two 
communities. It is an enduring debate, initiated in the 1930s when quantum mechanics was applied to 
chemistry, and still shows no sign of resolution. The debate concerns how quantum mechanics should 
impact chemical theory. 
 
That quantum mechanics should have an impact on chemical theory is motivated by its success in 
accurately modeling individual chemical systems. However, these models cannot answer many 
questions with broad and general scope. Questions about atoms and bonds, for instance, cannot be 
answered using these models because these models do not ‘speak’ in terms of atoms and bonds. Work 
must be done to bridge these models and chemical concepts, to show how atoms and bonds might be 
identified within the quantum mechanical models.  
 
While pursuing this task, chemists have engaged in a divisive and longstanding debate. There are in 
fact many ways one might bridge these models and chemical concepts. How chemists choose among 
and prioritize these options depends entirely on what they are trying to accomplish. There are two 
fundamentally different things that different chemists seek to accomplish.  
 
Some chemists seek to define chemical concepts in a way that is motivated by quantum mechanics. 
This is done by searching the physical equations underlying computational models for terms or groups 
of terms that behave in a manner that is similar to chemical concepts. Concepts are then defined by 
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these terms, and a clean connection between quantum mechanics and chemical concepts has thereby 
been made.  
 
Other chemists seek to define chemical concepts in a way that maintains core elements of their 
traditional role in chemical theory. This includes maintaining the familiar idea that an atom’s 
electronegativity is predictive of its charge in molecules, or the idea that the number of bonds an atom 
can form depends on its valence. In order to maintain concepts in this manner, proposals for bridging 
models and concepts are evaluated based on how well these conceptual behaviors are preserved. The 
motivation for this approach is that traditional chemical concepts are a simple means to qualitatively 
predict a wide array of molecular properties.  
 
Thus, the two camps disagree on how chemical theory should be modified to adapt to the introduction 
of a quantum mechanical underpinning. This dissertation analyzes the foregoing modes of conceptual 
development, the nature of the resulting concepts, and the implications for philosophy of chemistry. 
 
Chapter 1 lays the foundation for this analysis. Here, I introduce the topic of using high-performance 
computation models to inform preexisting conceptual practices. 
 
I begin with an excursion into chess theory, and address the question of how modern chess engines 
might impact traditional chess concepts. The chess engines are powerful, but do not ‘speak’ in terms 
of traditional chess concepts. Many chess theorists have debated how these engines might still inform 
the development of these concepts. Some argue that we can identify our concepts with certain sets of 
terms used by the engines, and thereby add precision to them; others argue that the engines show the 
futility of traditional conceptual practices. I offer an alternative account which I call computationally 
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guided conceptual development. Here, the aim is to use the engine as a means of testing the efficacy 
of our concepts without regard for how the engine comes to its decisions. When our concepts are 
shown to fail, the engine may be used to seek patterns in these failures. These patterns can then be 
captured by heuristics about the use of our concepts, and our concepts have thereby been refined.  
 
I proceed to more thoroughly introduce the same question for chemical theory: how have the modern 
computational models of chemistry impacted traditional chemical concepts? To get clear on the 
chemical concepts discussed throughout this dissertation, I provide a brief overview of Valence Bond 
Theory and several concepts rooted therein, including the chemical bond, electronegativity, strain, and 
the atom in the molecule. I likewise provide a brief overview of modern computational models used 
in chemistry, and gesture at how they construct approximate solutions to the Schrödinger equation. 
Together these overviews provide the means to appreciate the fact that modern computational 
models—accurate as they may be—do not ‘speak’ in terms of traditional chemical concepts. As with 
chess, many theoretical chemists have debated how these models might still inform the development 
of chemical concepts.  
 
The first chapter concludes with a brief description of two approaches to bridging the gap between 
computational models and traditional chemical concepts. The rigor-driven approach seeks to identify 
concepts with important elements of the physical equations on which the computational models are 
based. The understanding-driven approach uses the practice of computationally guided conceptual 




Chapter 2 shows how the tension between these two approaches to conceptual development can 
account for otherwise strange issues in the history of chemical theory.  
 
We look first at the concept of electronegativity, and how ambiguities in Pauling’s seminal introduction 
led to debate about the quantum mechanical basis of the concept and about whether standard 
electronegativity values were to be assigned to free atoms or to atoms in molecules. In dealing with 
these ambiguities, some chemists pursued more rigorous ways of conceiving of electronegativity, while 
others lamented that these rigorous conceptions were more difficult to use and did not provide 
practical advantage. To make sense of these concerns about usability, we examine how the concept is 
used to qualitatively organize various chemical behavior and how Pauling’s simple conception of 
electronegativity performs this task well.  
 
We turn then to the concept of the atom in the molecule (AIM) and I discuss several proposals for 
how atoms might be identified within molecules: Mulliken’s approach, the stockholder approach, and 
the topological approach. These approaches carve the molecule into different AIMs with different 
properties, raising the question of how these various approaches ought to be evaluated. Despite several 
multifaceted debates surrounding the concept of the AIM, in practice there are only two fundamentally 
different strategies used to evaluate these proposals. Some theorists evaluate conceptions of the AIM 
based on how neatly it fits with underlying physical models, and other theorists evaluate them based 
on their ability to qualitatively satisfy expectations derived from other chemical concepts, such as 
electronegativity. This latter evaluation procedure is shown to be a means of extending the 
functionality of a network of qualitative concepts, and is aligned with the practice of computationally 
guided conceptual development. 
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Chapter 3 elaborates on the two approaches to conceptual development by identifying their respective 
appeals and hurtles to their success. 
 
The rigor-driven approach is motivated by the philosophical presupposition that chemical concepts 
ought to be physically observable, as well as by several practical considerations. The latter include 
developing concepts that can be applied with precision and that can be applied in a manner that is 
consistent across all chemical systems. I show the ability to quantify chemical concepts with precision 
is only valuable if there is proper alignment between the accuracy of the conceptual scheme and the 
accuracy of the model as a whole. Likewise, I show that the value of being able to apply a conceptual 
scheme universally across all chemical systems is limited by the fact that model accuracy is often a 
function of the class of chemistry being modeled. Finally, I show how this approach often results in 
concepts that behave quite differently than traditionally understood, which we observe using the 
concept of the chemical bond as an example. Advocates of this approach are willing to embrace these 
changes to conceptual behavior. 
 
The understanding driven approach is motivated by what is often called ‘chemical understanding’. By 
looking at how concepts valued for this understanding are developed and used, I cash out this 
understanding as the ability to use concepts that achieve a balance between simplicity and qualitative 
accuracy across important areas of chemistry. Qualitative accuracy is shown to be assessed against two 
different kinds of data: observable chemical properties, such as bond dissociation energy or molecular 
polarity, and other chemical concepts. It is often not possible for concepts to be qualitatively accurate 
in both respects for all classes of chemical systems, and for this reason advocates of this approach 
sometimes adopt a pluralistic attitude about their concepts. Concepts can be redefined for different 
classes of chemical systems, and there is no singularly correct way to define concepts. Advocates of 
 6 
this approach are also willing to make use of ad hoc reference structures to quantify their 
‘unobservable’ concepts in a way that serves their aims.  
 
Chapter 4 explores future directions for philosophy of chemistry in light of the debate among chemists 
about the proper function of chemical concepts.  
 
I first critically evaluate an ongoing literature in the philosophy of chemistry that aims to establish the 
ontological status of the chemical bond. Chemists on each side of the debate adopt different positions, 
explicitly or tacitly, on philosophical issues including the ontology of chemical concepts. Because 
philosophers of chemistry neglect this debate, they cannot responsibly interpret chemists’ statements 
on these issues, and cannot hope to achieve an answer that is consistent with chemical practice. 
 
More broadly, I suggest a general problem with the current state of philosophy of chemistry is that 
there is a presumption among philosophers that the pragmatic conceptual practices adopted by many 
chemists means that the philosophical questions are being passed over. Instead, I suggest these 
practices are rich with philosophical implications and deserve the attention of philosophers of 
chemistry.  
 
In particular, I suggest there is important philosophical work to be done exploring what concepts built 
for understanding can and cannot do. I begin this exploration by broaching a longstanding debate 
among chemists about whether strain or hyperconjugation is more responsible for the barrier to 
rotation in ethane. I argue that concepts built for understanding are unable to provide a definitive 
answer to this question because this would require a reliable quantitative functionality of the concepts 
that is sacrificed during the course of their development. 
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On the other hand, concepts built for understanding are able to perform a variety of functions besides 
organize chemical data in way that makes simple qualitative patterns accessible. They provide a basis 
for evaluating model performance in a way that transcends the details of individual models, and in this 
way facilitate discussion about when a model will be more or less reliable than others. For the same 
reason, these ‘fuzzy’ concepts provide a useful guide for developing patchwork corrections to existing 
models. Finally, they are also able to play a key role in the development of computational models that 
seek to bypass the problem of model interpretability by building these ‘fuzzy’ concepts into the 
computational procedure at the very beginning. 
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2.0 The Problem of Interpreting the Computational Models of Chemistry 
This chapter introduces the problem of quantifying chemical concepts using computational models 
and serves as a broad introduction to the dissertation as a whole. I begin with an analogy from the 
realm of chess, where high-performance models are also widely used and pose similar problems for 
those seeking to use these models to quantify their traditional chess concepts. Upon returning to the 
realm of chemistry, I briefly introduce the chemical concepts that will be of interest later, namely 
electronegativity, the atom in the molecule, and strain. I then briefly discuss some complexities 
surrounding modern computational models in chemistry, which will help to illuminate why chemists 
make use of many different modeling approaches that are based on different approximations. Finally, 
I discuss the difficulty of connecting the chemical concepts and the computational models—that is, 
the difficulty of using the models to quantify or otherwise shed light on the chemical concepts. I 
outline two strategies for making this connection between computational models and chemical 
concepts, two strategies which will be engaged more thoroughly in the chapters to follow. 
2.1 Preamble: chess concepts in the age of chess engines 
This work focuses on chemical concepts, and their contentious survival in the era of computational 
chemistry. However, I would like to begin with a brief analogy that takes us into the realm of chess 
theory. The reason for this preamble is that the increased use of computers brought about similar 
problems for chess theorists as it did for chemical theorists—it is, I argue, a general phenomenon that 
is due to shared computational and modeling strategies in a variety of fields. Briefly examining the 
contours of these problems in the context of chess will prepare us for their more thorough 
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examination in the context of chemistry, and I hope, keep us from losing the forest for the trees. It 
will also prepare us for the broader discussion of conceptual thinking that will follow.  
 
Like chemists, human chess players face complex problems of analysis. While sometimes these 
problems can be exactly solved—when a forced checkmate is only a few moves away, or during the 
endgame, when few pieces remain on the board—for the most part, the chess player must rely on 
something that falls short of exact solution. In such situations, players must evaluate the position of 
their pieces relative to that of their opponent, and to do so without necessarily having a detailed plan 
for how that position will unfold in the moves to come. How do chess players make these positional 
evaluations?1 
 
Consider these two reasonable moves by white (Dvoretsky and Neat 2002, p. 62): 
                                                 
 
1 A distinction is often made between positional considerations and tactical considerations. Tactical 
considerations involve foreseeing the outcome of some exchange of pieces and are typically resolved 
by determining if the exchange is beneficial or not (which may or may not involve positional 
considerations). Positional considerations, the focus of the present discussion, do not involve a 
calculation of exchanges, and must be resolved by considering merely the position of the pieces, and 
often with a very tentative grasp on how the game will henceforth develop. 
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Figure 1: Positional analysis in chess 
Two reasonable chess moves (top) and their most reasonable follow-up moves 
(bottom). How do expert chess players evaluate the resulting positions, and determine 
which position is stronger? 
 
The rook to D2 would naturally be followed up by doubling the rooks on the D-file, whereas the 
knight advance to H4 would likely be followed with its movement to F5, in position to attack kingside. 
How do experienced chess players evaluate the relative merits of these two positions?  
 
To find the answer to this, we must look to chess theory, the foundation of which is conceptual in a 
manner that will be familiar when we turn to chemistry. When facing complex positions such as these, 
where one cannot see a concrete route to victory, chess students and professionals alike are advised 
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to base their decisions on longstanding, tested concepts; in this case, a concept of key interested in 
center control. The importance of this concept was laid out in Aron Nimzowitsche’s My System (1925), 
which is generally considered to have brought about the hypermodern school of chess (Averbakh 
2012) and remains  of central consideration to modern chess theory. In short, the idea is that a good 
position will, ceteris paribus, exert control over the central 4 squares of the board.2 The importance of 
controlling these squares is primarily due to the opportunities it affords: one can simultaneously exert 
pressure on both wings, and deploy when advantageous. “Without healthy conditions in the center, a 
healthy position is definitely unthinkable” (Nimzowitsch and Hays 1991, p.118; translation from 
Nimzowitsch 1925).  
 
In the analysis of the two moves offered above, the concept of center control is employed to favor 
the doubling of the rooks on the d-file (Dvoretsky and Neat 2002, p. 63). This position, more so than 
the knight flank, builds white’s control over the center, and this control has the potential to grow 
significantly if white decides to open the d-file with a pawn exchange. Because of the work that has 
been put into confirming the importance of center control—namely, having shown it to be 
predictively significant for a large number of games throughout history—the player can be reasonably 
confident that this position is stronger than the alternative. 
 
However, the ceteris paribus clause is important here; an overzealous pursuit of center control can lead 
to weak positions. To reconcile this fact with the concept’s strong reputation, one must appreciate 
                                                 
 
2 Control here is importantly distinct from occupation; the former can be measured by the number of 
pieces in position to attack the central squares. 
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that concepts come in sets. Center control is important, but so are other things, such as material 
advantage (roughly, having more pieces than an opponent) and piece mobility (having pieces where they 
are not blocked by others or restricted by the edge of the board). It is the shared purpose of the set 
of concepts to break down something vague but important—positional advantage—into 
comprehensible components that one may employ ‘on the fly’ while playing a game, at least after 
training. The analysis of positional advantage using chess concepts would ideally result in the correct 
assessment regarding who has the advantage, and perhaps even how strong that advantage is. Put 
more abstractly, we would like this set of concepts to be exhaustive in its assessment of positional 
advantage; if it leaves some ‘advantage’ out of the analysis, we would not know whether the remaining 
advantage favors us or our opponent, and therefore we would have some uncertainty regarding which 
side possesses the overall advantage. It is the job of chess theorists to continue to develop concepts 
in such a way that enables more exhaustive analyses in the foregoing sense.  
 
Let this, then, serve as a brief example of the kind of conceptual thinking on which chess theory has 
been built. For our purposes, the story continues with the rise of chess engines, capable today of 
outperforming the top human players by a significant margin. The question that has since been asked, 
on which the core of this dissertation hinges: how might we use the high-performance computational 
engines to update our conceptual tools? That is, can we use the engines to determine whether concepts 
ought to be kept or rejected; can we use the engines to employ the concepts with greater precision, or 
to modify their application in some way? Or, put yet differently, can we use the engines to create a 




There is some reason for thinking this ought to be possible in the case of chess. Chess engines are not 
merely a feat of brute force. They do not search through all the possible moves, stopping only when 
a winning position is found. While they indeed search deep—often several dozens of moves ahead—
due still to technical limitations and the complexity of the game, the engine must stop at some point 
and evaluate the position (see Ferreira 2013 for discussion). In this evaluation process, the engines 
employ parameters that, at the very least, may resemble traditional chess concepts, such as material 
advantage, center control, mobility, and passed pawns (Levy 2009). Coefficients that represent the 
value of these parameters are determined by training the engine over a large number of games. Can 
we not, at the very least, gain from a study of the chess engine an appreciation for the relative value 
of these different positional elements? This question has become especially pertinent as some recent 
chess engines, which though only performing at the level of a FIDE International Master thus far, 
have eschewed all deep searches and learned to rely almost exclusively on positional analysis alone 
(Lai 2015). 
 
Attempts to answer this question have led to some dispute. There are those who say computational 
engines have made much of past chess theory irrelevant (Campitelli 2013), or less strongly, that the 
style of modern grandmasters resembles a computer more so than any historical school of chess theory 
(Sardesai and Anand 2013). This general point of view is driven by the fact that computer engines 
have shown traditional chess concepts to fail in so many cases, arguably diminishing them to nothing 
better than pedagogical tools for beginners, and not something appropriate for professional 
understanding or guidance. About the potential for identifying chess concepts with terms in the 
positional evaluation functions used by the engines, it is said that this would be highly misleading for 
two reasons. First, the apparent use of these concepts in conjunction with an advanced search 
algorithm morphs the would-be-familiar concepts into something foreign; and second, because of the 
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dependence among the different terms in positional evaluation functions and the fact that several—
or sometimes even several hundred—unfamiliar terms are included, we cannot trust that seemingly 
familiar terms truly capture the concept they might resemble. We are thus in a position of being shown 
how to perform at a much higher level and having to eschew our traditional understanding to achieve 
this, if indeed we are capable of doing so.  
 
Conversely, there are those that say human players ought to hang on to their manner of conceptual 
thinking, and be extremely cautious when using an engine to inform positional considerations, if not 
avoid them altogether (Silman 2014). The primary argument here is that, over many decades of 
theoretical development, chess concepts have been forged into something that works for us humans, 
and we will never be able to effectively think in the terms employed by the chess engines. As such, 
when a chess engine tells us our concepts have led us astray in a certain position, the correct attitude 
to have is one of determination: work must be done to refine our concepts. And it is this practice in 
which we are primarily interested, a practice I call computationally guided conceptual development.  
 
The goal of this practice is to find a way of using our concepts to make sense of what the computer 
is telling us. So long as there is good reason to trust the overall assessment of the engine (in this case, 
that one position is better than another), we can carry out this practice without regard for how the 
computer came to that assessment. This is because, again, the goal is not to understand how the 
computer came to some conclusion, but rather to develop a way of thinking about the results that 
works for us, and ultimately allows us to play better chess.  
 
So, the computer has one way of thinking about chess positions, involving many inscrutable 
parameters trained over many games; and we have another way of thinking about chess positions, 
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involving longstanding and familiar concepts like center control, developed over centuries of 
theorizing. These two frameworks, different as they are, share a point of conversion, where they are talking 
about precisely the same thing: positional evaluation. The practice of computationally guided 
conceptual development aims to make this point of conversion a boon to our preferred conceptual 
framework. In this way, the engine becomes a tool for the chess theorist to find work, but where the 
details of how the engine works have little or no bearing on how the theorist does this work. 
 
 
Figure 2: Chess engine vs. network of chess concepts 
The computational framework of a chess engine (left) and the conceptual framework 
of chess theory (right) share point of conversion (center) where they are talking about 
the same thing. 
 
The practice of computationally guided conceptual development can be understood as follows. 
Concepts, such as those that make up a large part of theoretical chess, identify rough or imperfect 
trends and patterns. They might be considered highly efficient, though lossy, compressions of large 
swaths of information—in this case, about evaluations of chess positions. These concepts are useful 
to us because they straddle the line between predictive accuracy and simplicity, and by doing so they 
push our human computational limits. When these concepts lead us astray, as chess concepts are 
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shown to sometimes do when confronted with results from chess engines, they are not abandoned, 
but rather subject to a sort of conceptual calibration. Theorists will seek patterns in these errors, 
patterns which might be articulated in the form of a heuristic about the application of the concept. 
Often these heuristics are articulated in terms of other concepts; for example, center control is less 
important in ‘closed’ games (locked pawn structure) where pieces have lower mobility. If these heuristics 
are found, theory can be said to have advanced. The computational engine provides the data, but it is 
left to the theorist to organize it using domain specific concepts. Note that when this task is carried 
out for well-established concepts, the practice may resemble ad-hoc curve fitting: the theorist pursues 
their task under the assumption that these concepts are worth saving, and it is difficult to imagine 
evidence that could convince them otherwise. As such, they can be said to be working within a 
conceptual paradigm in the Kuhnian sense.  
 
So, what is the relationship between our conceptual thinking and high-performance computational 
models? My answer is this practice of computationally guided conceptual development. And the same 
practice characterizes the relationship between chemical concepts and physical models used in 
computational chemistry.  As with chess theory, much of modern chemical theory can be traced to a 
several major figures in the first half of the 20th century (Mulliken 1935; Pauling 1939), who promoted 
conceptual thinking that would be challenged by computational models developed in the latter part of 
the 20th century. There too is debate about how traditional chemical concepts ought to fair in the 
context of highly successful computational models—should they be eschewed, connected in some 
explicit way to the terms of the computational models, or some other alternative? And lastly, there 




2.2 Turning to chemistry 
Beginning in the 1920s and taking off in the 1930s, there was a rise in the amount of theory-generated 
data available about chemical systems. Early quantum chemistry was beginning to generate 
descriptions of chemical systems in terms of electronic orbitals, and at least for many simple systems, 
these descriptions were reasonably consistent with associated experimental data. Importantly, these 
descriptions also extended to chemistry that was not able to be observed in the laboratory, and even 
to chemistry that we might never see in the laboratory.  
 
These computational models were more than just a new source of raw data, more than just a new 
instrument to the experimentalist. For not only were these models generating data that needed to be 
accounted for, but they were also, in virtue of their theoretical underpinning, candidate explanations 
for the data they generated. Why is the barrier to rotation in ethane 3.2 kcal/mol? Why is fluorine the 
most electronegative element? Why is cyclopropane unusually stable? Because, so those most 
enamored by the new quantum chemistry would claim: the theory says it is so. Demonstrations offered 
using clearly defined terms, and despite the approximate nature of the endeavor, the numbers that 
backed these assertions would only become more accurate. In this context, it is easy to appreciate the 
conviction with which some chemists promoted the new quantum chemistry; the physical basis for 
chemistry has been found, and it was generating results.  
 
For the majority of chemists at the time, however, the descriptions generated by quantum chemistry 
were problematic for the reason that they were, of course, couched in terms of quantum mechanics. 
It was as if the models were generating answers to longstanding questions with the rider that you must 
think like this to understand. One might critically assume any problems these chemists had with the new 
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quantum chemistry was due to the fact that they were unfamiliar with the language and physical 
developments underpinning the theory, and while this was certainly true of many chemists at the time, 
I believe this assumption conceals a deeper and more interesting problem with these descriptions 
being couched in the terms of quantum mechanics. There is something to be said, I argue, about the 
terms and equations found in quantum chemistry not doing the same kind of explanatory work that 
traditional chemical concepts are capable of doing.  
 
This idea is something several prominent chemists have raised (esp. Pauling 1939; Coulson 1961; 
Hoffman 1998). Typically, the argument is that traditional chemical concepts facilitate chemical 
understanding, and conversely that concepts taken straight from quantum physics—which along with 
their equations, may provide very accurate quantifications of chemically relevant properties—fail to 
bestow this understanding. Before pursuing this line of inquiry, however, we will first briefly explore 
several of the concepts that are said to bestow understanding, as well as the high-performance models 
that do not, in any straightforward way, speak in terms of these concepts. 
2.3 Brief comments on the concepts of valence bond theory 
This section is intended to provide a brief introduction to the chemical concepts that will be 
investigated more thoroughly in the following sections, and it will do so by offering a very brief 
introduction to valence bond theory. A semi-historical introduction to these concepts will serve as a 
basis for Chapter 2, which will investigate their history in more detail. 
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The concepts employed in Valence Bond Theory, laid out in the first half of the 20th century, remain 
at the heart of much theoretical dialogue in chemistry. While they have roots that reach back to the 
19th century, it is Pauling’s 1939 discussion of the concepts in his textbook The Nature of the Chemical 
Bond that cast them into their modern form. 3 Superficially, they should be familiar to those with even 
a basic education in chemistry; their more technical forms will be discussed later. 
 
Valence Bond (VB) Theory is a direct development of Gilbert Lewis’ (1916a, 1916b) work on chemical 
valence and bonding. Prior to Lewis, it was already known that atoms of a given element typically—
though not always—engage in a characteristic number of bonds, which can be inferred by their group 
(column) in the periodic table;4 for example, hydrogen, in the first group, typically forms a single bond, 
while carbon, in the fourth (or 14th—5), often forms four bonds. Lewis posited that this behavior is 
due to the number of ‘valence’ electrons an atom has, and that it is these electrons that are able to 
participate in bonding interactions. Bonds, for Lewis, where formed when electrons pair up; typically 
each atom engaged in the bonding interaction will contribute one electron to the bond. To account 
for the fact that elements like fluorine, which would have seven valance electrons, typically only form 
one bond, Lewis posted his ‘rule of eight’: stable molecules contain atoms with eight total valance 
                                                 
 
3 In some cases, the concepts can be traced through to the 18th century or earlier, though answering 
questions of origin is not the aim of this work. See Jensen  (1996, 2003) for nuanced account of the 
origin of the concept of electronegativity.  
4 It was largely these bonding patterns that led to Mendeley’s articulation of the periodic table (Brock 
1993). 
5 14th rather than 4th due to the transition metals, which take up ten columns but are not present in the 
first three rows.   
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electrons, where this number is the sum of their native valence and any electrons shared with them 
through bonding; for example, carbon, fluorine, and other main group elements, prefer a valence of 
eight.6 The foregoing principles suffice to determine reasonable chemical structures for many 
molecules.  
 
These ideas, and in particular the diagrams Lewis developed to represent them, had already found 
widespread use among chemists when, a decade later, they were placed on more sound basis in terms 
of quantum physics (Heitler and London 1927; Pauli 1927; London 1928). Pauling believed this new, 
more rigorous basis was, “in the main equivalent to the rules which [Lewis] postulated”7, and 
presented these developments first in a series of papers titled “The Nature of the Chemical Bond” 
(Pauling 1931a, 1931b, 1932a, 1932b) and then in a popular textbook of the same title (Pauling 1939). 
He put the developments in a chemical language that would stick in the minds of chemists through to 
today, and which constitutes the basis for VB theory. 
 
Among the key ideas of VB Theory are the three concepts I will examine in this dissertation: the 
concept of the atom in the molecule, electronegativity, and strain. Briefly put, Pauling showed how it makes 
sense to talk about the properties of the atom as it exists within the molecule, such as its charge. The 
                                                 
 
6 This ‘rule of eight’, later coined the octet rule (Langmuir 1919), applies only to main group atoms. 
Hydrogen and Helium are satisfied with a valance of 2, while lower period elements can fit 18 electrons 
in their valence.  
7 L. Pauling, March 7, 1928. Lewis, G. N.: Correspondence, 1926-1945. Courtesy Ava Helen and Linus 
Pauling Papers, Special Collections & Archives Research Center, Oregon State University Libraries, 
Correspondence Box 216, Folder 216.1. 
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charge of an atom in a molecule can be used, for instance, to predict the molecule’s polarity, and therefore 
how the molecule will orient itself in the presence of other charged entities.8 To determine the charge 
of an atom in a molecule, VB theory offers another concept, electronegativity, described by Pauling as 
“the power of an atom in a molecule to attract electrons to itself” (1939, p. 58). Pauling assigned a 
single electronegativity value to each element, which one could use to semi-quantitatively calculate its 
charge in the presence of other atoms; for example, since oxygen is more electronegative than carbon, 
when atoms of these respective elements are bonded, one can be sure the carbon possess a partial 
positive charge, and the oxygen a partial negative charge.  As in Lewis’ work, bonds were something 
that existed locally between atoms; as such, it made sense to talk about the properties of bonds, such 
as their length or the angles between them. Already it was recognized that lone pairs were ‘bulkier’ 
than bonding pairs, which could be used to qualitatively predict preferred bond angles (e.g., the O—
H bond in H2O will be more acute than the 109.5° tetrahedral). In this theoretical context, it was 
                                                 
 
8 The most thorough discussion of the charge of atoms in molecules can be found in the 1st and 2nd 
editions of his textbook (pp. 65-66), and less so in the 3rd edition (Pauling 1939, 1940, 1960).  Personal 
archival research suggests the change in the 3rd edition is due to increased criticism of Pauling’s 
discussion of electronegativity, which will be discussed in Chapter 2. In any case, theorizing by other 
chemists about the charge of the atom in a molecule (esp. Mulliken 1935), and other properties thereof, 
certainly does not stop due to Pauling’s reservations. 
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straightforward to introduce the concept of strain to characterize molecules that—for one reason or 
another—are unable to reach their preferred bond angles or lengths.9 
 
These concepts all had a semi-quantitative character, often being employed only to a single decimal 
point. The degree to which they were related to the new quantum chemistry varied, and as we will see, 
there will be many attempts to make them more rigorous and more precise. At the same time, they 
were more than a first approximation; like the chess concepts examined earlier, they would serve as a 
conceptual basis that future chemists would work with and work to maintain, often despite some 
difficulty. In this regard, the particular difficulty we will examine is their apparent lack of 
straightforward relevance to modern computational schemes, and the subsequent difficulty of using 
computational models to inform these concepts. This kind of problem is not, generally speaking, new 
to chemical concepts. During the latter half of the 20th century there was a dispute—now well 
documented10—between advocates of VB Theory and those of Molecular Orbital theory.  This 
                                                 
 
9 For discussion of steric strain, see Pauling (1939) section 14 and 27. Note: I will not be focusing on 
the concept of the chemical bond, despite the fact that it has received more focus than any other 
concept from philosophers of chemistry. This is intentional, as later it will allow us to return to these 
discussions with a fresh perspective and see how longstanding debates can be shown to be misguided, 
without clouding our thinking beforehand. 
10 See especially (Brush 1999a, 1999b; Hoffmann, Shaik, and Hiberty 2003). Related, it is interesting 
to note that some historians have argued Pauling became somewhat estranged from the quantum 
chemical community because his ideas could not be readily integrated with the culture of increasing 
computational precision (Gavroglou and Simões 2012). I find this narrative at odds with the fact that 
many theoreticians put so much time into attempts to integrate Pauling’s ideas with quantum 
chemistry despite the difficulty of doing so.   
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episode in the history of chemistry displayed many of the core features we will see in our own case 
studies, and for many of the same reasons. For now, let me only promise that the reasons for the 
‘eclipse’ and eventual return of valence bond theory become clear on my account of chemical 
concepts. 
2.4 Brief comments on modern computational chemistry 
The underlying physical laws for the mathematical theory of a large part of physics and the whole 
of chemistry are thus completely known and the difficulty is only that the exact application of these 
laws leads to equations much too complicated to be soluble. 
-Paul Dirac 1929 
This quote conjures mixed feelings for many chemists. On the one hand, it nicely encapsulates many 
of the subsequent developments in computational chemistry, which aim to meet “Dirac’s Challenge” 
(Marvin Cohen 2003) by devising increasingly accurate methods of approximating the aforementioned 
physical equations; it is for this reason that the quote has become a staple to the introductory section 
in textbooks on computational chemistry. On the other hand, many chemists consider the quote a 
“backhanded swipe at chemistry” (Bachrach 2007) for insinuating that there is little interesting 
theoretical work to be done in chemistry.  
 
While it is the direct counter to this suggestion that I will ultimately pursue—that indeed, there remains 
plenty of interesting theoretical work to be done in chemistry—we cannot avoid some discussion of 
the computational details. That is, we must briefly discuss the approximate methods that have been 
developed following Dirac’s pronouncement. The reason we cannot avoid these details is the same 
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reason that theoretical chemists cannot avoid them: methods to approximate the exact solution to 
insoluble physical equations have become the source material for chemical theory. It is using these 
methods—though sometimes just the numbers they output—that theoretical chemists articulate their 
concepts, whether quantitatively or qualitatively. The following does not amount to a primer on 
computational chemistry, and those who seek such should look elsewhere (Cramer 2004; Bachrach 
2007).  
 
The insolubility of the physical equations underlying chemistry can be viewed as a twofold problem. 
First is the computational intractability resulting from the correlation of the particles. The form of the 
Hamiltonian (H), which when applied to the wavefunction of a chemical system results in its energy, 





where the five terms on the right quantify, in order from left to right: the kinetic energy of the 
electrons, the kinetic energy of the nuclei, electron-nuclei attraction, electron-electron repulsion, and 
nuclei-nuclei repulsion. This is an instance of the many body problem; even in a single carbon atom 
there are six electrons in addition to the nuclei.11 Various approximations are employed to get around 
                                                 
 
11 Treating the nucleus as a single particle is a practice shared throughout computational chemistry.  
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this computational intractability. For example, the widely adopted Born-Oppenheimer approximation 
assumes the nuclei are stationary relative to the electrons, significantly simplifying the second and fifth 
terms above. The manner of simplifying the remaining electronic terms is, for the most part, what 
distinguishes one computational approach from another. The Hartree-Fock method, for example, 
manages the correlation between the electrons by iteratively treating each electron as if it were 
subjected only to the mean field of all other electrons, rather than calculating all of their respective 
interactions. While many other methods have been devised to better capture electron-electron 
correlation, the approach that has gained widespread support in the past couple decades is rooted in 
density functional theory (DFT), where all electron correlation is handed in an approximate and 
computationally less expensive functional.  
 
A second class of computational difficulties results not from the complexity of the of the Hamiltonian, 
but from the fact that the form of the wavefunction is unknown. A rough but intuitive way of restating 
this: we do not know where the electrons are in the first place, and we must have at least a guess 
before we can apply the Hamiltonian. The general strategy for dealing with this problem is to construct 
the wavefunction from a linear combination of some basis functions, and to use the ‘variational 
principle’ to iteratively approach a more accurate wavefunction (Cramer 2004, p.108). In short, the 
principle states that the actual energy of any chemical system will be lower than that of any 
approximate wavefunction, which affords us the strategy of proposing a wavefunction formed from 
 26 
the basis functions, and checking to see whether it is lower in energy than our previous best guess.12 
But what should be included in this basis set? Here again, matters get complicated, and vary from 
application to application.13 
 
Thus, due to the intractability of the Schrödinger equation as well as our uncertainty regarding the 
form of the wave function, the actual calculations that are carried out in modern computational models 
in chemistry are quite messy, and stray from the models motivated by our physical understanding of 
these systems.  
 
As we begin to turn to the issue of conceptual understanding in chemistry, it is important to note that 
the manner in which these models stray from the physically motivated equations are often bracketed 
for the purpose of extracting conceptual understanding. That is, due to the wide variety and frequently 
changing approximations made by these highly successful models, many seek to quantify traditional 
                                                 
 
12 The variational principle does not hold true for all computational approaches, including DFT. 
Despite this, the iterative process seeks to minimize the energy, and the possibility of predicting a 
lower-than-actual energy must be considered.  
13 Following in the spirit of Molecular Orbital Theory, the atomic orbitals of the atoms in the molecule 
might be used as the basis functions. For example, the wave function of a water molecule might be 
constructed using a linear combination of the s orbital of the hydrogen atoms, and the s and p orbitals 
of the oxygen atom. The constructed wave functions only resemble molecular orbitals within a certain 
energy range, outside of which they take on strange and unfamiliar shapes. For reasons of 
computational efficiency, most computational approaches make use of modified atomic orbitals with 
different mathematical properties, be it Gaussian type orbitals or the Kohn Sham orbitals of DFT.   
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chemical concepts by identifying the concept with some aspect of the ‘pure’ model, as formulated 
without the approximations that are made for the sake of computational tractability. For example, this 
is strategy of those pursuing what has been called ‘conceptual DFT’ (P. Geerlings, De Proft, and 
Langenaeker 2003), where all approximations are bracketed and conceptual definition begins from the 
true electron density (which itself can only be approximated). Despite this bracketing of 
approximations, it is important to understand the mess to appreciate why the conceptual definitions 
take the form they do; most notably, to understand why so much of the conceptual talk centers around 
density rather than the more familiar orbitals.  
 
Once the ‘pure model’ has been selected, the exercise is to use its features to define the concepts that 
chemist want to maintain and make more precise. Sure, we know oxygen is more electronegative than 
carbon, but can we use the models to tell us exactly how much more? What, exactly, is the charge of 
the oxygen atom in cyclopropanone? How much strain is there in the molecule? More generally, as in 
the case of chess engines, many theorists are motivated to improve on our traditional methods of 
understanding these complex systems using modern high-performance models. And also again, how 
this ought to be done is a matter of great contention.  
2.5 The difficulty of quantifying traditional chemical concepts: two competing approaches 
‘The underlying physical laws […] are thus completely known and the difficulty is only that the 
exact application of these laws leads to equations much too complicated to be soluble.’ We amend 
this well-known statement of Dirac to read that ‘…these laws lead to equations much too 
complicated to be chemically useful even if they were soluble.’ 
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- Nicolaos Epiotis (1996) commenting on Paul Dirac (1929) 
With the Schrödinger equation, chemistry becomes structureless; each chemical system is described 
by its own wavefunction 
- Jansen and Wedig (2008) 
Despite the significant progress made towards approximating the exact solutions of these physical 
equations, there remains the task of showing how these high-performance models can be used to shed 
light on problems that are posed in terms familiar to chemists. Continuing the example above, modern 
computational models have no difficulty providing a very accurate value for the total energy of 
cyclopropanone, but do not in any straightforward way answer questions such as: ‘what is the charge 
of the oxygen atom?’, or ‘what is the steric strain of the molecule’. The simple reason for this is that 
these questions are formulated in terms of parts of the whole—the oxygen atom is part of the molecule, 
and the strain energy is part of the total energy—and the model is not designed to be straightforwardly 
decomposed into these parts. This is sometimes partially due to the various approximations that are 
made in order to make the calculations soluble.14 However, as Epiotis suggests, even when these 
concerns are bracketed, it is often not straightforward how we ought to make the connection between 
these physical models and talk of traditional chemical concepts. How should the molecular electron 
                                                 
 
14 For example, the local-density approximation made in many applications of DFT typically 
overestimates the correlation energy and underestimates the exchange energy. While these offsetting 
errors are usually tolerated due to the good overall performance of the models, these ‘parts’ of the 
calculation cannot be trusted (Becke 2014). 
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density be decomposed into its constituent atoms? Which of the five terms in the Hamiltonian 
contribute to steric strain, and how much in a given instance?   
 
In the absence of a single straightforward way to make this connection, many proposals are made. 
There are dozens of proposals for how one might quantify the electronegativity of the atoms using 
physical equations, and the same can be said of atomic charge. As above, these concepts are employed 
to identify and describe ‘parts’ of the molecular system, and as such, the competing proposals would 
lead users to identify the parts in alternative ways, quantitatively and sometimes even qualitatively. The 
following chapter discusses two case studies—electronegativity and atomic charge—in greater detail 
to show how these competing proposals emerge, and why the plurality often proves to be resilient. 
For now, I would like to briefly consider the general question of how these proposals ought to be 
evaluated. That is to say, given several two or more proposals for how to quantify the idea of 
electronegativity (or some other chemical concept), how should one determine which among them 
are better, or possibly best? What are the criteria by which they are judged? This is the central question 
explored in this dissertation. 
 
I tackle this question by first analyzing the debates among chemists surrounding this issue (Chapter 
2), and subsequently offering an account of conceptual development in the context of modern 
computational chemistry (chapter 3, and in outline here). The analysis of existing debates reveals the 
presence of two distinct camps among chemists, who approach the evaluations of competing 
proposals in categorically different manners.  
 
The rigor-driven camp. On the one hand are chemists who aim to develop concepts that are motivated 
by the physical theory on which successful computational models are based. According to these 
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theorists, chemical concepts ought to be clearly definable within the physical equations used to 
accurately calculate the molecular structure and energy. The primary advantages of defining concepts 
in this way is that they can be assigned quantitative precision, and in a manner that is consistent across 
all chemical systems. During the past two decades, this approach to the development of chemical 
concepts has largely taken up camp in the context of DFT approaches to chemical computation, and 
posited the identification of features of the molecular electron density and chemical concepts. For 
example, such theorists commonly assert that electronegativity is nothing but the negative of the 
chemical potential, that the atom in the molecule is identical to basins in the electron density, and that 
bonds are just the path in the electron density that connects nuclei and passes through the intervening 
saddle point in the electron density (see Bader 2008 for a prominent example). Each of these features 
of the electron density—the chemical potential, the basins, and the ‘bond-paths’—is unambiguously 
defined in the physical equations, and behaves in ways that are similar to how the corresponding 
chemical concept was previously employed. Similar but not identical, and thus changes to the chemical 
concepts are being proposed with the goal of establishing a neater connection between the concepts 
and the physical models. Philosophical positions sometimes supply additional motivation for this way 
of developing chemical concepts. 
 
The understanding-driven camp. Other theoretical chemists place less value in establishing a neat 
connection between physical theory and chemical concepts, and instead prioritize what is often 
referred to as ‘chemical understanding’. That is, chemical concepts ought to be defined and developed 
in ways that allow chemists to better understand molecular phenomena and the computational data 
that describes it (see Hoffmann 1998 for a prominent example). However, what this understanding 
consists in has never been spelled out clearly or in detail. A large part of my dissertation will be the 
elaboration of the precise nature of this understanding and how it guides the development and 
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quantification of chemical concepts. In brief, I argue that chemical concepts afford understanding 
when they optimize a tradeoff between simplicity and qualitative accuracy across important domains 
of chemistry.15 That is, chemical understanding is possessed when concepts can be employed in 
operations that are simple enough to be easily performed without the use of a computer calculation, 
and yet are qualitatively accurate across large swaths of pertinent chemistry. The following chapter 
contain several case studies that aim to show how these criteria interact to guide theorists of this camp 
in the development of chemical concepts. We will see how, in the pursuit of this chemical 
understanding, theoretical chemists of this second camp are willing to propose ways of defining 
chemical concepts that break from the physical models in ways that otherwise appear stubborn and 
shortsighted. 
 
To better show what the understanding-driven camp is doing, I describe the function of chemical 
concepts and articulate the practice of computationally guided conceptual development. Although the 
evidence for these claims will be found in the following chapter, their outline can be stated as follows.16  
 
Concepts, such as those that make up a large part of traditional chemical theory, identify rough or 
imperfect trends and patterns. They might be thought of as highly efficient, though lossy, 
                                                 
 
15 Here I draw on de Regt’s (2017) account of scientific understanding, which also focuses on 
qualitative prediction. See also Hoffman’s (1998) brief remarks on qualitative prediction. In regards to 
the tradeoff, c.f. Lewis (1973).  
16 Note how well this description fits with the chess analogy, or specifically traditional chess concepts 
now confronted with higher performance chess engines. 
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compressions of large swaths of information—in this case, about energy and other properties of 
molecules. These concepts are useful to us because they straddle the line between predictive accuracy 
and simplicity, and by doing such they push our human computational limits. When these concepts 
lead us astray, as traditional chemical concepts are shown to sometimes do when confronted with 
results from modern computational models, they are not abandoned, but rather subject to a sort of 
conceptual calibration. Theorists will seek patterns in these errors, patterns which could be articulated 
in the form of a heuristic about the application of the concept. Often these heuristics are articulated 
in terms of other concepts; for example, Pauling’s electronegativities are effective in the context of 
main group chemistry, but less reliable when transition metals are involved. If these heuristics are 
found, theory can be said to have made advances. The computational model provides the data, but it 
is left to the theorist to organize it using domain specific concepts. Note that when this task is carried 
out for well-established concepts, the practice may resemble ad-hoc curve fitting: the theorist pursues 
their task under the assumption that these concepts are worth saving, and it is difficult to imagine 
evidence that could convince them otherwise. As such, they can be said to be working within a 
conceptual paradigm in the Kuhnian sense.  
 
It is this practice of computationally guided conceptual development that defines the relationship 
between traditional chemical concepts and modern computational models in chemistry. The same 
practice relates chess concepts and high-performance chess engines, and yet additional cases where 
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theorists seek to use high-performance computational models to inform traditional conceptual 
thinking.17 
                                                 
 
17 I talk about concepts, but this research might be pursued in the context of several different topics 
in the philosophy of science. It touches on scientific explanation, models, concepts, and more recently, 
understanding. The proceeding discussion—and perhaps this entire dissertation— might be tailored 
to any of these literatures. I have chosen to employ the language of conceptual practices in part 
because it fits most closely with the pertinent discussions within the chemical literature, but also, as I 
hope to show in what follows, because I believe it sheds more light on these other topics in philosophy 
of science than vice-versa. 
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3.0 Two Case Studies in Chemistry: Electronegativity and the Atom in the Molecule 
The central aim of this chapter is to provide a background on some chemical concepts that will be 
used as examples in the following chapters. I also lay the groundwork for showing how their contested 
development can be organized by the framework I offer, namely the division of theorists into the 
rigor- and understanding-driven camps. If this chapter contains a thesis, it is merely that the history 
of these concepts is well suited for this organization. 
 
As such, this is primarily a standalone chapter, and readers not interested in the particulars of the 
history of the concepts would do fine to proceed to the following chapter, which is more 
philosophically oriented. 
3.1 Introduction 
As previously stated, many chemical concepts are attributed to parts of the molecule, such as atoms 
and bonds, and these parts are not explicitly recognized in the physical equations used in modern 
computational models. A primary job of the theoretical chemist is to generate strategies for 
interpreting the results of computational models using these familiar chemical concepts, and to show 
how the results make sense for reasons stemming from the expected behavior of the concepts. This 
is to say, there is a gap between our ability to precisely calculate the properties of molecules and our 
ability to explain the results of these calculations using chemical concepts, and it is the task of the 




As we will see, a common feature of the development of chemical concepts is a plethora of ways they 
might be quantified, and concomitant disagreements about which quantification scheme ought to be 
preferred. While the details vary from concept to concept, I argue that there is a general story to be 
told, a story that captures the common elements in the disagreements, and that reveals the conflicting 
motivations held by the interlocutors. In short, I argue there is a disagreement among theoretical 
chemists regarding the proper function of chemical concepts, and that in this regard, theoretical 
chemists fall into one of two camps. Here I show how these camps can be identified in the history of 
the concepts. 
 
Note that here and elsewhere I choose not to focus on the concept of the chemical bond, which is 
the chemical concept most discussed by all parties involved, especially philosophers of chemistry. I 
avoid the concept of the bond in order to emphasize the generality of the trends I identify, and not 
because the concept poses problems for my account. In fact, debate about the nature of the chemical 
bond has spurred precisely the same philosophical and intransigent debates; for an example in this 
context, see a recent defense of the so-called unreal:  “There is a future for unicorns in chemistry even 
after quantum theory has been introduced” (Frenking and Krapp 2007). It is my hope that focusing 
on general trends common to less explored chemical concepts will provide a fresh perspective that we 
can later use to return to discussions about the chemical bond, and shed light on why the philosophical 





The concept of electronegativity—often characterized as the power of an atom to attract electrons to 
itself—has become a cornerstone in chemical theory, being used to rationalize the polarity of 
molecules, different ‘kinds’ of bonding interaction, and the larger part of acid-base chemistry, among 
other things. But despite the widespread use of the concept, there remains debate about the proper 
way to employ and understand it, and the debate spans several questions. Two questions in particular 
have survived nearly a century now: i) should a single electronegativity scale be privileged over others, 
and ii) should electronegativity be viewed as an intrinsic property of free atoms and ions, or rather as 
an in-situ property, defined by an atoms interaction with other atoms and changing along with the 
chemical environment. Following a brief historical introduction to the concept, these questions will 
be laid out, and I will gesture at how my philosophical framework can make sense of these 
longstanding debates.18  
 
                                                 
 
18 This does not amount to a survey, historical or otherwise. For a recent and accessible survey of 
many of these developments, I recommend Haghi (2012). There are many more technical takes on 
the same developments, but see especially Batsanov and Batsanov (2012, section 2.4) and Bergmann 
and Hinze (1996). 
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3.2.1  Pauling’s ambiguous introduction 
The groundwork for Pauling’s seminal work on electronegativity was laid in Gilbert Lewis’(1916) 
paper, “The Atom and the Molecule,” in which the difference between covalent and polar bonds is 
presented as a difference in degree. Lewis plotted the relative polarity of different classes of molecules 
along a smooth quadratic “without attempting to give any quantitative definition of our terms” (p.765). 
When the term electronegativity appeared in Pauling’s notes in the early 1930s, the sole function of 
the concept was to serve as a means for the quantitative calculation of the degree of polarity of a 
bond.19 The presence of the concept of electronegativity within the chemical literature expanded 
significantly following Pauling’s 1932 publication, published as the fourth in a series of seven papers 
under the heading, “The nature of the chemical bond,” which would collectively earn Pauling the 1954 
Nobel Prize in Chemistry and provide the foundation for his widely read textbook of the same name 
(1939, 1940, 1960). 
 
To discuss the polarity of a bond in quantitative terms in his 1932 paper, Pauling needed a source of 
chemical data, and his choice of bond energies would for the most part be idiosyncratic to Pauling 
throughout the 20th century.20 Pauling made the assumption that he somewhat problematically termed 
                                                 
 
19 L. Pauling, Notes, Calculations, Assorted Materials re: Electronegativity and the Electronegativity 
Scale, No Date [1930s]. Courtesy Ava Helen and Linus Pauling Papers, Special Collections & Archives 
Research Center, Oregon State University Libraries, LP Science Box 5.001, Folder 1.14. 
20 Though see Batsanov & Batsanov (2012) for a discussion of other minor contributors who made 
use of bond energies.  
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the additivity of bond energies: that for “normal covalent bonds”, the energy of a bond between atoms 
A and B (A:B) is equal to the arithmetic mean of the energies of their corresponding homonuclear 
diatomic molecules, A:A and B:B; that A:B = 1/2 (A:A + B:B) (p. 3571).21 Whenever this additivity 
did not hold—when the bond energy of A:B was larger than predicted on the assumption that it was 
a normal covalent bond—then to that extent the bond possessed ionic character. Using this 
assumption to calculate the degree of ionic character of a bond, Pauling identified a pattern in the 
degree of ionic character across chemical combinations. This pattern allowed him to assign each 
element a rough electronegativity value, X, such that the difference between the electronegativity 
values of two bonded atoms could be used to calculate the approximate degree of ionic character 
according to the equation ΔA:B = (XA – XB)1/2, where ΔA:B is the additional bond energy due to ionic 
character, or the deviation from the bond energy expected from the postulate of additivity. The range 
of electronegativity values in this paper was arbitrarily set between 0 and 2 for the least and most 
electronegative atoms there examined, hydrogen and fluorine respectively.22  
 
As a method of tabulating empirical bond energies there was no doubting the value of Pauling’s 
insight, but Pauling’s characterization of the concept in quantum chemical terms would continue to 
be a source of criticism throughout his career. Pauling defined a “normal covalent bond” to be one 
                                                 
 
21 While “additivity of bond energies” more commonly means that the energy of a molecule was simply 
the sum of the energies of the bonds that composed it, here Pauling is really talking about the additivity 
of the energy of the bond halves, that the energy of the bond A:B is the sum of the energy of A. and .B. 
22 The more familiar 0-4 range would appear in Pauling’s textbook on the matter (1939). While there 
was no explicit justification given for the change, one can argue it makes sense based on the spread 
and precision of the values. 
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where the ionic contributions of A+B- and A-B+ possessed equal weight in the wave function describing 
the bond.23 The problem was whether Pauling had the means to determine whether a bond was normal 
covalent independent of whether measures of bond energies satisfied his additivity assumption. His 
claim that the additivity postulate is supported by “a convincing body of empirical evidence” contains 
only a citation to an article by Pauling and Don Yost (1932), a colleague at Caltech, submitted only 
nine days prior to Pauling’s electronegativity paper (p. 3572). This three-page paper only discusses the 
bond energies of the hydrogen and alkali halides, and only so far as to show that these energies are 
larger than predicted by the additivity postulate on the assumption that the bonds were normal 
covalent. Although this is favorable evidence given that these molecules were expected to be highly 
polar based on considerations of crystal structure and ionization energies, no attempt is made to 
quantify these implicit considerations. This left the determination of the quantified degree of ionic 
character of a bond entirely up to the difference between measures of actual bond energies and those 
predicted by the additivity postulate—hardly a convincing body of empirical evidence.24 The 
connection between electronegativity and quantum mechanics—both what this connection is as well 
as its importance—remained underdeveloped in Pauling’s work. 
 
                                                 
 
23 This corresponds to the case where constants c2 and c3 are equal in the wave equation assigning 
electrons 1 and 2 to atoms A and B:  
Ψ = c1(ψA(1) ψB(2) + ψA(2) ψB(1)) + c2(ψA(1) ψA(2)) + c3(ψB(1) ψB(2)) 
24 Oglivie (1990) has gone so far to accuse Pauling of making a tautology in this regard. However, this 
accusation leaves completely unexplained the widespread embrace of Pauling’s work on the concept. 
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Also underdeveloped was the rationale for assigning a single electronegativity value to each element. 
A close examination of the method by which Pauling obtains what are repeatedly called “approximate” 
values shows an awareness of the sensitivity of electronegativity values, as Pauling conceived them, to 
the chemical environment (1932, p. 3571, p. 3576). This awareness is most clear in his discussion of 
cases that violate the additivity assumption. Homonuclear bonds are by definition completely covalent, 
and yet it was clear that the strength of several homonuclear bonds were sensitive to the chemical 
environment. For instance, it is noted that the carbon-carbon single bond in diamond is 0.2 eV 
stronger than that in hydrocarbons, which would suggest that carbon atoms in diamond were more 
electronegative than carbon atoms in hydrocarbons. Rather than offer a method for estimating the 
degree of this sensitivity of electronegativity values to the chemical environment, Pauling resorts to 
candid remarks about the approximate nature of the singular values he was assigning each element. 
He writes: “I have arbitrarily chosen to ignore diamond” (p. 3574); “…it is possible to make a rough 
assignment of the atoms to positions along a scale representing their electronegativity” (p. 3576, 
emphasis added). Lecture notes from earlier in the same year mention deviation from additivity being 
only a “qualitative indicator” of the ionic character.25 
 
This talk of the approximate and practical functionality of the concept comes without any strong 
indication of whether the values being derived are to be applied to the atoms in the molecules (in situ), 
or to the corresponding free atoms prior to the formation of the molecules (intrinsic). One might take 
                                                 
 
25 L. Pauling, Berkeley Lectures. February - March 1932. Courtesy Ava Helen and Linus Pauling 
Papers, Special Collections & Archives Research Center, Oregon State University Libraries, LP 
Science Box 2.002, Folder 2.5, p. 8. 
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Pauling’s reliance on bond energies as evidence that these atoms are to be found in their molecular 
state, but this alone is insufficient. The great strength of the hydrogen fluoride bond, for instance, may 
be due to the difference in electronegativity between the respective free atoms that upon formation 
of the bond has diminished or even disappeared altogether. Five years later (1937), in his first dated 
notes dedicated to the calculation of electronegativity values, he again refers to the concept as a 
“property of an atom” without further specification.26 It is likely that this distinction was not yet on 
Pauling’s mind. Although he would soon explicitly advocate an in situ conception (1939) and maintain 
this position through to the mid-80s, for now he passed over the distinction without remark. Pauling 
was well aware of Robert Mulliken’s (1934, 1935) work on the concept, which explicitly ascribed 
characteristic electronegativity values to free atoms. Pauling’s 1937 notes also contain several exercises 
of the derivation of Mulliken’s values, which largely agreed with his own, without any 
acknowledgement of this conceptual difference. When he took the opposing position—ascribing 
characteristic electronegativity values to atoms in molecules, in situ—he does so without any 
argumentation to support his divergence from Mulliken’s handling of the concept, or discussion that 
there even was an alternative way of conceiving of the concept (1939). It was left to the broader 
community to make these competing positions clearer.  
 
                                                 
 
26 L. Pauling, Manuscript Notes: "Ionic Character of Bonds", [re: the concept of electronegativity] 
April 11, 1937. Courtesy Ava Helen and Linus Pauling Papers, Special Collections & Archives 
Research Center, Oregon State University Libraries, LP Science Box 5.001, Folder 1.9. 
 42 
3.2.2  Dealing with the ambiguity: two approaches carve the boundaries 
Pauling’s widely disseminated introduction of electronegativity became the central reference point for 
other work on the concept, and there was a significant amount of other contributions. These 
contributions often conflicted with each other either by assigning different electronegativity values to 
the elements—quantitatively and sometimes even qualitatively27—or by assigning the concept 
fundamentally different behavior. I argue the source of much of these disagreements can be traced 
back to ambiguity in Pauling’s seminal work, and that the different directions in which the concept is 
pulled is indicative of theorists attempting to do different things with the concept. This section begins 
with a summary of these contributions and the conceptual tension, and ends by gesturing how much 
of the subsequent debates can be made sense of by the lines drawn by the rigor- and understanding-
driven camps. 
 
Much of the fodder for debates about electronegativity comes from the plethora of ways one can 
reasonably measure this ‘power’ of an atom to attract electrons.28 Soon after Pauling’s 1932 discussion, 
several additional electronegativity scales were produced by other theoretical chemists using a variety 
of alternative measures. While Pauling employed measures of bond energies to derive his 
                                                 
 
27 Here and generally in this thesis, ‘qualitative’ is used to capture ‘more’ or ‘less’ comparisons between 
chemical systems. For example, a qualitative difference here would be disagreement about whether 
hydrogen was more or less electronegative than carbon.  
28 For important surveys, see Prichard & Skinner (1955), Allen (1994), and Batsanov & Batsanov 
(2012). 
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electronegativity values, J. Gilbert Malone (1933)29 employed dipole moments, Robert Mulliken (1934, 
1935) employed spectroscopic data, Walter Gordy (1946) employed calculations of effective nuclear 
charge at the covalent radii and (1951) nuclear quadrupole coupling, and Robert Sanderson (1951) 
employed calculations of electron density. Each of these scales was in approximate agreement with 
Pauling’s when fit to his values, with few discrepancies regarding their relative order.30 In the third 
edition of his textbook (1960) Pauling would consider each of these investigations as evidence of the 
ability of his electronegativity values to roughly systematize these various atomic and molecular 
measurements. However, these comments would mask important conceptual disagreements between 
these theorists, disagreements which Pauling would publicly ignore for another several decades. 
 
The conceptual disagreements were in regards to the what should be used to establish baseline 
electronegativity values, as well as how these values were affected by a change in the chemical 
environment. Where Pauling used molecules that exhibited a VBT single bond to establish his baseline 
values, Malone was more inclusive in the molecules he used to derive his values, and Mulliken, Gordy, 
                                                 
 
29 This “fortuitous” scale was largely discredited by Mulliken (1935). 
30 Typically the scales were fit by fixing the maximum and minimum electronegativity values, and using 
a linear or quadratic equation to place the intermediate values. The resulting scales tended to disagree 
on the electronegativity values of hydrogen and metals liable to form double bonds. See Gordy (1946) 
for discussion. 
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and Sanderson relied on free atoms to establish theirs.31 Except Sanderson, these theorists also 
employed different terms to quantify the sensitivity of electronegativity values to the chemical 
environment. Whereas Pauling only discussed how the electronegativity of an atom would increase 
with positive charge and decrease with negative charge, Gordy’s work using effective nuclear charge 
had the electronegativity of an atom increasing with an increase of double or triple bond character, 
while Mulliken’s spectroscopic work and Gordy’s nuclear quadrupole coupling work had 
electronegativity decreasing with an increase in p or d character of the bonding orbital. These methods 
of determining electronegativity changes are often at variance with each other. Increasing the double 
bond character of a bond will increase the electronegativity of the bonded atoms according to Gordy 
(1946), but may decrease it according to Pauling (1939), depending on the charge. Increasing the p 
character of a bonding orbital will decrease the electronegativity of the atom according to Gordy 
(1951) and Mulliken (1934), while it can have no effect on the electronegativity according to Pauling 
(1939).32 Thus while it appeared these different approaches to electronegativity calculations agreed on 
                                                 
 
31 Mulliken could alternatively use atoms in an unhybridized state to establish his. Note that a VBT 
single bond can be formed between either hybridized or unhybridized atomic orbitals, and in fact 
many of the simple molecules Pauling used to derive his scale consisted of bonds formed by hybridized 
orbitals. 
32 See Batsanov & Batsanov (2012, section 2.4) for discussion  
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the general trend across the period table, their proponents held different assumptions about the source 
of baseline electronegativity values and how these values were affected by the chemical environment.33 
 
In short, there are many of different ways one might conceive and quantify electronegativity, and some 
confusion about which ways might be better than others, or how to go about the process of evaluating 
the competing proposals. As two theorists would put the confusion, “It is difficult to understand the 
meaning of a quantity if one does not know in what units it is to be expressed” (Iczkowski and 
Margrave 1961). While several different attitudes have been adopted to help make sense of the 
concept, two trends capture the bulk of the historical details.  These trends will roughly correspond 
to the rigor- and understanding-driven approaches to conceptual development.  
3.2.2.1 Concerns about the theoretical justification of electronegativity 
 
One point of ambiguity in Pauling’s introduction of the concept was the importance of the basis of 
the concept in quantum mechanics. While the derivation of electronegativity values really only required 
solving a system of algebraic equations involving bond energies, he supplemented this with simple 
quantum mechanical reasoning. Pauling supposed that the wave function of a molecule AB could be 
                                                 
 
33 Some theorists have argued that it was a mistake to ever assign electronegativity values to atoms in 
molecules at all (e.g., Leach 2012). Instead, such theorists argue that electronegativity should be 
considered a ‘transcendental’ property of atoms and that only a single fixed value should be assigned 
to each element, akin to nuclear charge.  
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approximated by the linear combination ΨAB = γΨ(AB) + αΨ(A+B-) + βΨ(A-B+), and that α and β 
would be approximately equivalent only when the electronegativities of A and B were equal. However, 
this connection to quantum mechanics was only stated quickly in his 1932 paper, and received an 
equally brief discussion in his textbook (1939). Whether this discussion is properly ‘quantum 
mechanical’ became a point of contention in the following decades, with both Mulliken (1940) and 
Coulson (1952) arguing that Pauling’s discussion was lacking in this respect, and would remain so 
throughout the 20th century.  
 
The first steps along the path suggested by the rigor-driven approach was taken by Mulliken only two 
years after Pauling’s seminal formulation, when he suggested that the electronegativity of atoms be 
defined as the average of their first ionization energy and electron affinity. Mulliken started with 
Pauling’s supposition that the wave function of a molecule AB could be approximated by the linear 
combination ΨAB = γΨ(AB) + αΨ(A+B-) + βΨ(A-B+), and went on to argue that α and β will be equal 
in magnitude when IA – EB = IB – EA, where I is ionization energy of the respective atoms and E is the 
electron affinity. This condition is met when IA + EA = IB + EB, making the sum of ionization energy 
and electron affinity a way to quantify electronegativity using well defined physical terms (1934, p. 
783).34 Mulliken claimed to “throw new light on the physical meaning of the concept of 
electronegativity,” which was “obscure” and “largely empirical” in the work of Pauling (p. 782). 
                                                 
 
34 Mulliken also divided the each side by two, making the electronegativity of an atom the average of 
its ionization energy and electron affinity. No strong reason was offered as to why division by two 
was included.  
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Whether or not Mulliken’s conception of electronegativity is truly more rigorous can be contested.35 
But in any case, this movement of pushing the concept to be more cleanly defined in terms of the 
quantum mechanics of the time developed a following. From Coulson’s popular 1952 textbook: 
“Pauling, on purely empirical grounds [proposed electronegativity values]. It was left to Mulliken to 
show that a better measure of electronegativity is…” (p. 133); “It should be added in this connection 
that Mulliken’s estimates of electronegativity are fundamentally much more precise than are Pauling’s, 
since they are based entirely on observable quantities” (p. 135).  
 
In private correspondence, Pauling contested these characterizations of his work. While we are 
interested in the development of the concept and not exclusively in Pauling’s contributions, it is worth 
taking a look at his response because it helps to identify the crux of a disagreement that persists still 
today.  
 
“Page 133. Here you say ‘Pauling, on purely empirical grounds, first suggested that... .’ The whole 
discussion of electronegativities in my 1932 paper was based on theoretical arguments – quantum 
mechanical arguments. I do not think that your sentence gives the reader the correct impression 
about my introduction of the electronegativity scale, the concept of the stabilization of bonds through 
partial ionic character, and so on.  
                                                 
 
35 It may be difficult to maintain the idea that Mulliken’s conception of electronegativity is more 
rigorous when his derivation involves “trial assumptions to be tested empirically” (1934 p. 783).  
Nonetheless, it is the idea that his conception is more rigorous in virtue of its unambiguous quantum 
mechanical formulation that concerns me.  
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[…] 
Page 135. At the bottom of the page you say that Mulliken’s estimates of electronegativity are 
fundamentally more precise than are Pauling’s since they are based entirely on observable 
quantities. My values are, of course, based on heats of reaction, and only on heats of reaction, and 
these are observable quantities. It seems to me that your statement is wrong, in that it suggests that 
my values are not based entirely on observable quantities.”36 
 
These passages raise several questions pertinent to our present inquiry (and several others about 
changes to Pauling’s attitudes about these points).37 First is the question of what constitutes a proper 
‘quantum mechanical argument’ for the concept of electronegativity. More concretely, what fault does 
                                                 
 
36 Pauling contested this distinction between his work and Mulliken’s in private correspondence: L. 
Pauling, Correspondence: Charles Coulson. Sept. 25, 1952. Courtesy Ava Helen and Linus Pauling 
Papers, Special Collections & Archives Research Center, Oregon State University Libraries, 
Correspondence Box 68, Folder 68.4.  
37 The first of these objections mark a drastic change in Pauling’s attitude about the rigor of the 
derivation of his own electronegativity values. Both the quantum mechanical argumentation and the 
use of bond energies displayed in Pauling’s work was sustained only by the additivity postulate, which 
earlier Pauling was content to admit lacked rigorous justification: “[The] additivity of the energies of 
normal covalent bonds has no rigorous theoretical justification and cannot be expected to hold in all 
cases” (Pauling & Yost 1932). Beginning with this exchange with Coulson and lasting for the 
remainder of his career, Pauling would instead defend the rigor of his derivation against charges that 
his work lacked formal rigor (Pauling & Herman, 1986; Pauling, 1988). When Coulson finally 
responded to these matters over nine months later, he does not mention electronegativity, nor does 
he make a single change in the discussion thereof in the second edition of his textbook (1961). 
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Coulson have with Pauling defining electronegativity in terms of α and β in the approximate wave 
function equation? Presumably it is that they are not observable quantities, but merely terms that 
appear in a first order approximation of the wave function. On the other hand, bond energies as 
defined by heats of reaction, which Pauling actually uses to derive electronegativity values, are 
observable as Pauling notes, but they are empirical values rather than secure quantum mechanical 
terms.38 Likewise, Pauling’s arguments based on the stabilization of partial ionic bonds will not get 
him far in this exchange, since the degree of ionic character was not properly grounded in the quantum 
mechanical framework of the time; this is in contrast to the ionization energy and electron affinity, 
used by Mulliken, which can be identified with the energy of electronic orbitals.39 Additionally, the use 
of ionization energies allowed for a proper ‘zero point’ that did not exist for Pauling’s comparative 
bond energy calculations, making Pauling’s conception ‘relative’ where Mulliken’s is often said to be 
‘absolute’ (Mulliken 1934, Gordy 1946). All of this is, at least presumably according to Coulson, gave 
Mulliken’s conception of electronegativity a more secure quantum mechanical foothold. 
 
This line of reasoning—focusing on the neatness of the ‘fit’ with rigorous quantum mechanics—is 
one strategy for privileging one electronegativity scale over others, and it is prevalent through the 
history of electronegativity (and as we will see, other chemical concepts). It is the very same approach 
                                                 
 
38 It is reasonable to assume that the heats of reaction Pauling uses are actually the combined effect of 
several effects (once properly understood) besides bond dissociation energies. 
39 While the orbitals that appear in the physical models are not precisely the true orbitals due to 
necessary approximations (touched on in Chapter 1), they approach this as our approximations and 
computational capabilities improve. 
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used to promote the more recent conception of electronegativity as the negative of the chemical 
potential. In the context of the density functional approach to chemical modeling, which currently 
dominates the computational scene, the negative of the ‘chemical potential’ behaves very similarly to 
how one would expect electronegativity to behave.40 Because this term appears directly within the 
mathematics used to calculate the energy of chemical systems, many prominent theoretical chemists 
have promoted its identification with electronegativity (Iczkowski and Margrave 1961; Parr et al. 1978; 
P. Geerlings, De Proft, and Langenaeker 2003).41 
 
In the following chapter I further explore the question of what constitutes a neat fit, and why having 
such a fit might be desirable. First, we will explore another branch of the history of electronegativity, 
where I will argue theorist are trying to do something very different with the concept and accordingly 
bring different standards of evaluation to the many different ways of conceiving the concept.  
3.2.2.2 Concerns about the variable electronegativity values of atoms in molecules 
 
A second feature of Pauling’s discussion that received critical attention was a tension buried within 
his own conception of electronegativity: his insistence that electronegativity is a property of an atom 
                                                 
 
40 The chemical potential shows up as a Lagrange multiplier when minimizing the energy with respect 
to electron density; see (Parr et al. 1978) for details.  
41 Interestingly, this identification is sometimes often touted as vindication for Sanderson’s principle 
of electronegativity equalization (1955, 1983), or the idea that upon formation of a molecule, the 
electrons are pushed between the constituent atoms until their electronegativities become equal. Most 
other conceptions of electronegativity do not behave this way, including Pauling’s.  
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in a molecule (1939, p.58), or what would come to be called his in-situ conception of electronegativity, 
coupled with his ascription of only a single electronegativity value to each element. The reason these 
two aspects of his conception harbor a tension is that together they seem to imply that an atom of a 
given element exists in the same state regardless of its bonding interactions, an implication that 
contradicts the very method Pauling used to establish electronegativity values in the first place. To 
address this tension in the first edition of his textbook (1939), Pauling supplemented his treatment 
with a discussion of how the electronegativity of an atom would vary with its charge in the molecule.42 
His estimation of this variation was candidly approximate, and no quantum mechanical reasoning was 
used to support these approximations. Furthermore, nowhere did Pauling elaborate on the sensitivity 
of electronegativity values to the chemical environment, and the discussion was dropped from later 
editions of his textbook (1960).  
 
                                                 
 
42 Specifically, according to Pauling’s 1939 discussion, a +1 charge on an atom in a molecule will 
increase its electronegativity approximately 2/3 of the way to that of the element to its right on the 
periodic table, and vice versa, with a negative charge decreasing its electronegativity partway to the 
atom on its left in the periodic table (Pauling 1939).  
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It is likely Pauling dropped these considerations because his procedure for obtaining electronegativity 
values from bond energies did not easily allow for this functionality.43 However, other conceptions of 
electronegativity did allow for this, including Mulliken’s approach using orbital energies. Since atomic 
orbitals are appropriately sensitive to the chemical environment, determining how an atoms 
electronegativity changes from one molecule to another is simply a matter of calculating the energy of 
the appropriate orbitals. Furthermore, the widely employed Valance Bond Theory of the time offered 
a convenient framework for doing just that using the idea of hybridization: carbon that is sp3 
hybridized (e.g., CH4) could then be assigned a different electronegativity value than carbon that is sp2 
(C2H4) or sp (C2H2) hybridized (Mulliken 1935). 44  Needless to say, the chemical potential, and so the 
DFT conception of electronegativity, would also be sensitive to the molecular environment in a 
precise way (thought there are some hurdles in terms of identifying the atom in the molecule, explored 
in the following section). 
 
                                                 
 
43 Using bond energies to quantify the electronegativity of a given element in various chemical 
environments would require somehow incorporating a variety of other bonds (reflecting the various 
chemical environments) into the calculation; however, the molecular heats of reaction used by Pauling 
to obtain bond energies for simple diatomic molecules does not neatly extend to more complex 
molecules. In particular, there is no recipe for decomposing the molecular heat of reaction into the 
constituent bonds without relying on a theoretically more nuanced analysis, which Pauling sought to 
avoid in the first place. Additionally, his brief proposal for using atomic charge (preceding footnote) 
surely did not pan out with much generality.  
44 Note that the language of ‘hybridization’ and ‘valance state’ has historically been inconsistent and 
varies between subfields—sometimes they are equivalent and sometimes not. For our purposes they 
can be treated as the same.   
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As more nuanced procedures were developed for handling the sensitivity electronegativity to the 
chemical environment, concerns began to grow about the simplicity of the concept. Here is a nice 
expression of these concerns in a landmark survey on the concept following these developments 
surrounding Mulliken’s conception of electronegativity:    
 
The crucial point, as Evans [(1951)] has remarked, is that there is the possibility that every 
molecule must needs be treated as a special case. (Is the valence state of nitrogen the same in NH3, 
in NF3, and in N(CH3)3?) It seems clear that the further development of the electronegativity 
theory will attempt to define the range of electronegativity open to an atom. There remains the 
problem of choosing from the range the unique value which the atom achieves in a given molecular 
environment. Unless some comparatively simple criterion of choice can be found...the discomforting 
possibility that Evans has foreseen may become a very real one. 
-Pritchard and Skinner (1955) 
 
This passage speaks to a very different trend than those pushing to place the concept on more secure 
quantum mechanical grounds. There was something appealing about only having to think about a 
single electronegativity value for each element, and the prospect of losing that was ‘discomforting’.  
 
To appreciate this concern, it is worth looking at how the concept is employed in practice. Above it 
was noted that the plethora of empirical measures one might use to obtain electronegativity values 
was a source of some debate (which is best?)—however, in practice this can be considered a virtue. 
Simply by referencing an electronegativity table—even if it only assigns a single value per element—
one is able to make rough predictions about an array of chemical properties, and this is precisely in 
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virtue of the fact that the many ways of obtaining electronegativity values are in rough agreement with 
each other. With these values, it is straightforward to predict molecular polarity, relative ionization 
energies, the strength of bonds, the location of any hydrogen bond donors, and more. While there are 
some errors in these rough predictions, they are for the most part qualitatively accurate, and variable 
electronegativity values simply amount to an unnecessary complication when the concept is employed 
in the foregoing manner.45 Additionally, Pauling’s values do quite well in when used for this purpose, 
and in some notable cases better than Mulliken’s.46 Pauling himself, in later years, evaded discussion 
of the ‘rigor’ of his conception of electronegativity by stating that the concept is clearly useful enough 
for this to be a non-issue (Pauling & Herman 1986, Pauling 1988). And apparently others agreed—
then and now—as Pauling’s values have remained in widespread use. 
3.2.3  Electronegativity concluded 
In the following chapter, I further explore the foregoing conceptual utility as a feature of some 
concepts, which I call generality of qualitative accuracy.  We will also explore these opposing 
considerations—between finding a conception that fits well with physical theory, and finding one that 
allows for this simple qualitative reasoning. 
                                                 
 
45 Again by qualitative accuracy I mean that predictions using the concept make the right comparisons: 
Which atom is more electronegative? Which molecule is more polar? And so on.  
46 One notable difference between the Pauling and Mulliken scales is the different ordering of 
hydrogen and carbon – Pauling’s values have carbon more electronegative than hydrogen, and 




For now, it is worth gesturing at one discussion that has been passed over in the above brief and 
selective history of the concept. An additional question that that has repeatedly raised by theorists is 
whether a definitive scale must be identified. That is, do we need to select one measure of 
electronegativity as definitive of the concept, or can productive science be done with concepts that 
identify larger sets of measures that share a family resemblance?  While many theorists have argued a 
single measure ought to be privileged (e.g., Parr et al. 1978, Allen 1994), other prominent theorists 
have argued that electronegativity is an inherently ‘fuzzy’ concept and admits no precise definition, 
and that this is acceptable (e.g., Coulson 1952, Gonthier et al. 2012). Notice that these two positions 
correspond fairly neatly with the two ‘concerns’ discussed above: those who prioritize having a neat 
connection to physical theory are generally inclined to seek a definite scale, whereas those who 
prioritize qualitative reasoning are more permissive of a plurality of conceptions of electronegativity. 
That is to say, organizing the literature around these two camps helps to elucidate this debate as well.  
3.3 The atom in the molecule 
With electronegativity behind us, we can proceed more quickly to show that many of the historical 
features witnessed there are present for other chemical concepts as well. Additionally, we will see how 
interaction between these contested concepts adds another layer to the debate.  
 
We turn now to the concept of the atom in the molecule, or the idea that the individual atom persists 
after it becomes part of a molecule, and continues to possess properties of its own.  Above, when we 
explored the idea of an atom’s electronegativity changing depending on the molecule of which it is a 
 56 
part, this presumes the existence of the atom in the molecule—something that continues to exist and 
continues to possess the property of electronegativity. The most common property of an atom in a 
molecule that is discussed is its charge. For example, what is the charge of the oxygen atom in an H2O 
molecule?  
 
Determining the properties of an atom in a molecule requires a procedure for identifying it, and this 
is where matters become both complicated and contentious. Rather than explore the history of the 
concept in the manner we did for electronegativity, we will briefly examine several proposals for how 
this identification procedure might be carried out, as well as outline the major debate surrounding the 
concept that has received a good amount of attention the past two decades. Following this, I will again 
gesture at how my philosophical analysis (Chapter 3) will make sense of these longstanding debates.  
3.3.1  Three ways to identify the atom in the molecule 
The many ways to identify the atom in the molecule (AIM) can be divided into two classes: orbital-
based approaches and density-based approaches.47  
 
                                                 
 
47 Though see Cramer (2004) Section 9.1.3 for additional approaches. I am setting aside two 
approaches discussed therein, namely what he calls the intuitive approaches and the semi-empirical 
approaches. These additional approaches reinforce what I will come to say about how many chemists 
make use of the concept of the AIM (to facilitate a conceptual network with certain qualitative 
functionality).  
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Orbital based approaches assign electrons to atoms based on the degree to which their atomic orbitals 
contribute to the occupied molecular orbitals. While in some sense there are as many orbital-based 
approaches to identifying the AIM as there are computational approaches to calculating energetics, 
usually only ‘natural’ bonding orbitals are used for this purpose. That is, after the molecular structure 
is accurately calculated by whatever means, the resulting electronic density is transformed into the 
more familiar atomic orbitals of Valence Bond Theory, after which assignment of the electron density 
is straightforward.48 Incidentally, this approach was developed primarily by Mulliken( 1932 ,1955), and 
the resulting atomic charges are typically called Mulliken charges. Notice that this method of 
identifying the AIMs presupposes that it remains sensible to talk about their atomic orbitals, even 
though these are not physically observable and are only used to calculate the molecular properties in 
an indirect way. 
 
Density-based approaches are typically considered more rigorous because they are based on a proper 
physical observable: the electron density. They also have the advantage of being more easily visualized. 
The game here becomes developing a procedure for partitioning the electron density into the 
constituent atomic electron densities. The two density-based AIM procedures that have received the 
most attention are the topological AIM and the stockholder AIM. 
 
                                                 
 
48 Alternatively, the molecular structure can be calculated using some form of ab initio Valence Bond 
Theory (discussed in Chapter 4) or a simple Hartree-Fock approach, in which case no transformation 
is needed. See Weinhold and Landis (2012, chapter 3). The latter option, however, leads to an 
undesirable sensitivity to the basis set used to calculate the molecular energetics.  
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According to Bader’s (1990) topological partition scheme (henceforth “the topological AIM”), an 
atom in a molecule is identified with a three dimensional real-space region bound by a zero-density 
gradient in the map of electron density. All and only the electron density within these basins are 
attributed to the single atom whose nucleus is also within the basin, and it is the union of the nucleus 
and the basin of electron density that together make up the atom in the molecule. Topological AIMs 
are non-overlapping, separated by a definite boundary, and these boundaries often possess “sharp” 
edges, as in the nitrogen example below (Figure 3, bottom left). 
 
A second commonly used partition scheme is Hirshfeld’s  (1977) stockholder partition scheme 
(henceforth “the stockholder AIM”). One identifies stockholder AIMs by assigning the molecular 
electron density to the individual atoms using a weighting scheme obtained from a theoretical 
construct called the “promolecule”. The promolecule consists of superimposed free atoms in space 
with their nuclei in the location where they actually exist in the molecule, but without letting their 
electron density change to reflect the other atoms. One may imagine the promolecule as a Venn 
diagram-like theoretical entity, although the density of each atom in the promolecule actually extends 
over all space. In computational practice a cutoff is made, but even so, each atom will typically overlap 
with every other atom at every point within the promolecule. Then a weighting factor is obtained for 
each point in space based on the percentage of the density at that point that is due to each atom in 
the promolecule—that is, based on the atom’s ‘investment’ at that point. After these weighting factors 
are obtained for each point in space, the promolecule is replaced with the molecular electron density, 
which is then partitioned into the individual atomic electron densities using these weighting factors. 
The more an atom 'invests’ in a point in the promolecule, the greater the payout from the electron 
density that ends up at that point. In contrast to topological atoms, stockholder atoms are more 
spherical, completely lack sharp edges, and overlap with each other (Figure 3, bottom right). 
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Figure 3: Two ways of identifying the atom in the molceule 
Two different partition schemes as applied to a single nitrogen atom in N2 (topological 
AIM bottom left, stockholder AIM bottom right). In each of the three images, the two 
‘+’s represent the nuclei in the molecule, and the contour lines display the electron 
density. The two images on the bottom show the electron density assigned to the atom 
on the ‘left’ of the molecule according to the two competing schemes (Adapted from 
Davidson and Chakravorty 1992, p. 321).    
 
The question then arises: how should chemists choose between these two partition schemes? While 
these are two historically prominent partition schemes, there are many more (see Schwarz and 
Schmidbaur (2012) for thorough survey). The resulting AIM’s possess different properties depending 
on which scheme is selected; this selection also affects the manner and degree to which the AIM will 
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change in response to changes in the chemical environment.49 One might wonder whether there is a 
simple empirical test to decide which of these AIM concepts is correct, if either. The answer to this 
question is itself a matter of debate, as is the more basic question of whether the atom in the molecule 
can be directly observed. It is in debating these and related questions that theoretical chemists have 
waxed philosophical. After briefly identifying the contours of the debate, I will gesture at how they 
can be understood as the product of the rig0r- and understanding-driven camps pushing the concept 
in different directions. 
3.3.2  Debate about the correct way to identify the AIM 
The question of how this evaluation and selection process ought to be carried out has spurred 
acrimonious and, even within the chemical literature, philosophical debate. These debates have 
focused on several related questions, including whether the AIM is observable in principle (Parr et al. 
2005; Matta & Bader 2006), the manner in which the atom does or does not continue to exist after it 
forms a molecule (Sukumar 2012), whether the properties of the AIM are “determined by nature” 
(Schwarz and Schmidbaur 2012), and whether it is appropriate to employ a plurality of AIM partition 
schemes (Bader 1999, 2011; Shahbazian 2013; Eberhart & Jones 2012; Parr et al. 2005). Amidst these 
multifaceted debates, the AIM has even been called a “Kantian noumenon [...], a conceptual construct 
ultimately unknowable by observation but conceivable by reason” (Parr et al. 2005, p. 3958; see Ayers 
                                                 
 
49 Note that, potentially unlike electronegativity, it would make little sense to conceive of the AIM as 
being insensitive to the chemical environment. The very premise is that that atoms continue to exist 
in an altered form upon formation of a molecule. 
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et al. 2007 for similar comments). Additionally, it has been argued that pluralism with regard to the 
AIM is required for “chemical understanding” without elaborating on the nature of this understanding 
(Bultinck et al. 2007; Gonthier et al. 2012; Shaik 2007). 
 
Despite the many lines of argumentation surrounding the concept, there remain two general strategies 
for evaluating the various proposals for identifying the AIM. As above, these will correspond to the 
rigor- and understanding-driven camps.  
 
On the one hand are theoretical chemists who argue for their preferred conception of the AIM—
generally a single conception—based on its fit with underlying physical theory. This includes Richard 
Bader and his collaborators, who argue that all chemical properties ought to be Dirac observable,50 
and that only topological AIMs, in virtue of their satisfying Schwinger’s (1951) principle of least action, 
will possess such properties (Bader 1999, 2006; Shahbazian 2013). Others argue that a single proposal 
ought to be universally adopted—usually Bader’s system—for the purpose of creating a consistent 
and rigorous theoretical system (Eberhart & Jones 2012). When theorists in this camp evaluate a 
proposal for how to identify the AIM, they prioritize its fit with the physical models underlying 
modern computational chemistry; “like all true physical concepts, that is, those determined by 
                                                 
 
50 That is, they argue all chemical properties, such as atomic charge or electronegativity, ought to have 




observation, the choice is dictated by physics and the definition of an atom in a molecule is unique” 
(Bader 1999). 
 
On the other hand, many practicing chemists argue that no single proposal for identifying the AIM 
fully captures the content of the concept, and that doing so requires the adoption of different, mutually 
incompatible AIM concepts for different classes of molecules. This kind of pluralism is a byproduct 
of an alternative strategy for evaluating AIM proposals: seeing how compatible the proposal and 
resulting AIMs are with other chemical concepts. For example, another concept that intuitively ought 
to come into play in discussion of atomic charge is electronegativity. Atoms in the molecule that have 
a greater “power to attract electrons to themselves” (Pauling 1939, p. 58) should, other things being 
equal, have a more negative charge. This, anyway, is how the concept is intended to work, and this 
intention can be realized if the right charge partition scheme is selected. Accordingly, one approach 
used to select a partition scheme is to test how well it conforms to these expectations relating to 
electronegativity considerations. In the following chapter, we will examine this practice in more detail; 
for now, it is enough to note that the end result of this practice is the use of different AIM partition 
schemes for different classes of molecules—whatever enables other chemical concepts (e.g., 
electronegativity) to function as expected (e.g., see Saha, Roy, and Ayers 2009).   
 
The concerns of these pluralists may not appear to match those seeking a single-valued conception of 
electronegativity; however, in the following chapter we will examine in greater detail the practice of 
developing flexible conceptual networks to capture simple qualitative trends, and we will see how both 
this pluralism about the AIM and the single-valued conception of electronegativity contribute to the 
process of developing these conceptual networks. In short, the flexibility of drawing from different 
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conceptions of the AIM is required in order to maintain simple qualitative accuracy for the conceptual 
network as a whole.  
 
More generally, in the following chapter I will elaborate on the two camps which, again, correspond 
to the (roughly) two sides in the foregoing debates. The rigor-driven camp seeks to establish a rigorous 
and clean connection between the concept of the AIM and quantum mechanics, whereas the 
understanding-driven camp seeks to develop the concept in such a way that it facilitates qualitative 
prediction. Ultimately, I argue that the two camps are trying accomplish very different tasks with their 
concepts, and for this reason seek to develop concepts with different features. 
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4.0 Two Approaches to the Development of Chemical Concepts 
I do not believe in the existence of parallel universes wherein their laws are either ignored or ‘bent’ 
to accommodate personal points of view.  
-Richard Bader 2011 
It is nice to know that the computer understands the problem. But I would like to understand it 
too.  
-Eugene Wigner  quoted in Shaik 2007 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter 2 we saw a host of debates about the correct way to define the chemical concepts of 
electronegativity and the atom in the molecule. Amidst high performance computational models that 
do not ‘speak’ in terms of these traditional chemical concepts—or at least not in any straightforward 
way—there were many proposals for how we might bridge this gap and use the models to quantify 
these concepts. It is in the evaluation of these proposals that contentious and often philosophical 
disagreements regularly arise. Understanding the contours of these disagreements in a general way is 
the aim of the present chapter.  
 
It is my central argument that the theorists engaged in these debates fall rather neatly into one of two 
camps that disagree on the intended function of chemical concepts. I elaborate on the nature of these 
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camps throughout the present chapter, but in short: the rigor-driven camp aims to craft concepts that 
possess a neat connection with the physical theory on which computational models are based, whereas 
the understanding-driven camp aims to craft concepts that make simple qualitative patterns more 
accessible. Once their respective motivations are understood, their conflicting approaches to 
conceptual development can likewise be understood.  
 
Similarly, my analysis of these debates will reveal that questions about the nature of chemical concepts, 
pursued in the small but growing field of philosophy of chemistry, cannot be resolved without first 
addressing this disagreement about the intended function of chemical concepts. For the two camps 
develop concepts that, while they often go by the same name, possess very different features that 
enable them to perform very different functions; they might reasonably be said to have different 
‘natures’.  
4.2 Concepts for rigorous description 
On the one hand are chemists who aim to develop concepts that are motivated by the physical theory 
on which successful computational models are based. According to these theorists, chemical concepts 
ought to be clearly identifiable within the physical equations used to accurately calculate molecular 
structure and energetics. To the extent that traditional chemical concepts ought to stick around, they 
ought to be identifiable in this way; accordingly, should the concepts need to be modified in order to 
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be so identifiable, these adjustments are welcome. And where such identifications can be found, they 
should be regarded as definitive.51  
 
I call the collective advocates of this approach to defining chemical concepts the ‘rigor-driven camp’ 
because I believe ‘rigor’ is a fair way to summarize the various qualities these theorists seek to build 
into their concepts. However, I wish to avoid certain implications this name may suggest. I do not 
mean that they are more careful in their conceptual practices than those outside the camp, and 
conversely there is no reason one cannot consider the practice of the opposing camp to be rigorous, 
even if quite different than that here so labeled. Rather, in choosing this label, I am relying on the 
common notion that rigorous theoretical work in this context involves a greater reliance on 
mathematics and precise quantification, in contrast to the more qualitative alternative discussed in the 
following section.52 
 
During the past two decades, this approach to the development of chemical concepts has largely 
centered around density functional theory (DFT) -based approaches to chemical computation; many 
proposals are made for defining chemical concepts using features of the molecular electron density, 
                                                 
 
51 Some comments on my chosen terminology. By ‘identifiable within the physical equations’, I mean 
able to be expressed in in an equation using only terms already present in the physical equations, and 
using them in a straightforward way. If an identification is ‘definitive’, it rules out the possibility of 
alternative identifications that are incompatible with or contradict the definitive identification in any 
way. 
52 See Hendry (2004) for a similar dichotomy in the early history of quantum chemistry, and which 
relies on similar terminology.  
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so many that there is a now a subfield referred to as ‘conceptual DFT’ (Geerlings et al. 2003, Geerlings 
et al. 2014; Becke 2014). As shown in the previous chapter, it is asserted that electronegativity is 
nothing but the negative of the chemical potential (Parr et al. 1978), that an atom in a molecule is just 
a basin in the electron density (Bader 1990), and that a chemical bond is just the path in the electron 
density that connects nuclei and passes through the intervening saddle point in the electron density 
(Bader 1990, Bader 2008). Each of these features of the electron density—the chemical potential, the 
basins, and the ‘bond-paths’—is unambiguously defined in the physical equations and behaves in a 
way that is similar—though not identical—to the behavior of the corresponding chemical concept as 
previously understood. In this section I explore the appeal and implications of these conceptual 
practices. 
4.2.1  Practical motivations and hurdles to their payoff 
There are two major practical motivations for defining concepts in the foregoing way. First, the 
resulting concepts can—at least under the right circumstances—be quantified with precision. Second, 
they can be quantified in a manner that is consistent across all chemical systems. These are two natural 
consequences of having the concepts based directly on the physical details on which the computational 
models are constructed. The resulting concepts can be quantified with as much precision as the model 
is able to be run, and since the models are indiscriminate with regard to the chemistry being modeled 
(in the sense that the same computational scheme can be used to calculate the energies of any chemical 




However, in practice, both of these draws can encounter trouble. First, whether or not a 
computational model can be used to precisely quantify a concept (again, defined in some explicit way 
using the theory on which a computational model is based) depends on the extent to which the 
accuracy of the relevant theoretical details and that of the conceptual quantification are aligned. 
Sometimes treating the relevant theoretical details accurately improves the accuracy of the conceptual 
quantification, and interestingly, sometimes it can impair it. This is perhaps best illustrated by way of 
example. 
 
Consider the concept of atomic charge, or a specific example: what is the charge of the oxygen atom 
in an H2O molecule? As previously examined, there are competing proposals for how one might 
quantify atomic charge. For simplicity, consider two: Mulliken’s partition scheme and Bader’s QTAIM 
scheme. Briefly put, Mulliken’s scheme assigns charges to atoms by partitioning the electron density 
in molecular orbitals according to how much the involved atoms (and specifically, their atomic 
orbitals) contribute to the formation of the molecular orbital, and equally splitting electron density in 
the ‘overlap region’ (Mulliken 1955). Because this partition scheme depends on the orbitals used to 
construct the molecular orbitals, it is sensitive to the choice of basis set, and of course, choosing any 
finite basis set is an approximation needed for the sake of computational tractability. Problematically 
for Mulliken’s scheme, more realistic atomic charges are obtained when a smaller basis set is chosen 
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due to unreasonable charge partitioning when a larger basis set is used.53 This is a problem because, 
unsurprisingly, using a larger basis set improves the overall accuracy of the model with respect to the 
system-wide energetics it calculates. Therefore, if atomic charge is defined as per Mulliken’s scheme, 
the accuracy of the atomic charge quantification is at odds with the overall accuracy of the 
computational model used to calculate it. This phenomenon—of there being a tradeoff between 
model accuracy and our ability to accurately quantify some concept—is common among orbital-based 
approaches to conceptual recovery. 
 
However, this problem is not universal. Typically, density-based approaches to quantify atomic charge, 
including Bader’s QTAIM scheme, are not critically affected in the forgoing manner by the choice of 
basis set or other approximations. Again, according to Bader’s proposal, atomic charge is quantified 
by integrating over the basin in electron density assigned to that atom (and which he also uses to 
define the atom altogether). Atomic charge is calculated directly from the electron density, and since 
the accuracy of the calculation of electron density improves with the use of larger basis sets, so too 
will the accuracy of the atomic charge assignments as per the QTAIM. Likewise for other 
approximations made in the context of DFT: the computational tractability they purchase is traded 
                                                 
 
53 Since the electron density in overlapping regions is split equally by the involved atoms, a larger basis 
set (esp. the inclusion of explicit diffuse functions) will lead to more overlap and therefore more charge 
transfer. Strange things can happen as a result; e.g., centralized atoms will have a disproportionate 
amount of negative charge assigned to it. Also, a comment about the use of ‘unreasonable’ in this 
context. Amidst debate about whether the charge of an atom in a molecule is even a real thing, what 
I really meant to say is that the charges that result are not valued by any party involved.  
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off against model accuracy on system-wide energetics, and these energies are determined exclusively 
by the electron density. This means that no approximation will simultaneously improve the accuracy 
of the model and diminish our ability to accurately quantify atomic charge as conceived by this density-
based scheme, and so too with other conceptual identifications based directly on the electron density. 
 
The second draw to this strategy of defining concepts—namely that their subsequent quantification 
can be applied universally, irrespective of the chemistry being modeled—can also run into trouble. 
While the models may be used to calculate the energies of any chemical system, their accuracy 
sometimes varies across different classes of systems. Accordingly, a conceptual quantification 
procedure based cleanly on the details of a particular model can likewise demonstrate variable accuracy 
depending on the system being calculated. DFT approaches are no exception to this: current  methods 
of approximating electron correlation systematically underestimate long-range correlation (Klimeš and 
Michaelides 2013). As such, they are relatively inaccurate when it comes to calculating energies of 
systems where long-range correlation plays a significant role, such as extended carbon systems. While 
there are attempts to design add-on corrections for these models (dispersion corrections are touched 
on in the next chapter) these corrections constitute ‘patch work’ theory that are generally not 
encouraged by the advocates of the rigor-driven camp.54 
                                                 
 
54 The theoretical standing of these patches is a complicated issue. Even in procedures that are touted 
as ‘ab initio’ it is typical to include some manner of empirical fitting. Sometimes one procedure will 
even be touted as “less empirical” than another (Grimme et al. 2010), but sorting out the import and 
validity of such statements is set aside for another time.  In any case, the DFT patches mentioned here 




These practical considerations are not the only reasons some theorists advocate for this approach. In 
addition, this approach develops concepts in a way that satisfies several philosophical presuppositions 
one might reasonably have about the way science ought to work. Before engaging with these 
presuppositions, we will first look at the kind of conceptual changes that are embraced in the pursuit 
of concepts that possess a neat connection to physical theory. 
4.2.2  Willingness to embrace conceptual modification 
It is important to appreciate the willingness with which theorists of this camp accept modifications to 
their traditional chemical concepts in order to satisfy their desire to define concepts in the foregoing 
fashion. Although such changes can be seen in the previous chapter, a more compact example from 
the existing literature is as follows.  
 
This relates to debate about the proper way to define the chemical bond. According to one advocate 
of the conceptual DFT program, chemical bonds ought to be understood as lines along the path of 
maximum density that connect neighboring atoms and which pass through a saddle point in the 
electron density (Bader 1990). These saddle points are local density minima along the line connecting 
the atoms, and local density maxima along the perpendicular. For example, five bond paths can be 
seen in the electron density contour map of ethene (below, left), the saddle points marked as dots. 
This way of defining the bond recovers the structure characteristic of ethene. However, there are 
scenarios, if sometimes contrived, where this way of defining the bond diverges significantly from 
traditional understanding of the chemical bond. For example, when an argon atom is placed inside a 
buckeyball, according to the foregoing conception of the bond, argon forms a bond with each of the 
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sixty carbon atoms that make up the sphere (below, right) (Cerpa et al. 2008). This is very much in 
conflict with the traditional understanding of the chemical bond, according to which carbon can form 
a maximum of four bonds. The originator of this DTF-based conception of the chemical bond, 
Richard Bader, very much characterizes the rigor-driven approach; when confronted with the 
buckeyball ‘counter example’ to his definition of the bond, he bluntly states that his definition was 
never meant to capture the traditional understanding of the chemical bond, which besides, he argues 
is “too restrictive to account for the physics underlying the broad spectrum of interactions between 
atoms and molecules” (Bader 2009).  
 
This change (and others)55 to the traditional understanding of concepts are welcomed for the sake of 
establishing a neater connection between the concepts and the physical models. That is, in 
considerations about whether a conceptual modification should be adopted, little weight is given to 
whether or not the redefinition would be in accordance with longstanding conceptual practices. 
                                                 
 
55 Less contrived divergences between Bader’s bonds and traditional chemical also exist; for example, 
Bader’s bonds are often highly ionic even in cases that are widely accepted to be covalent (Fonseca 
Guerra et al. 2004). Regardless, Bader continues to embrace these changes; for example, another 
characteristic reponse: “Relating structure to a topological property of the electron density necessarily 
broadens the scope of the concept of structure, extending it beyond the models that were used in its 






Indeed, disrupting these practices is sometimes touted as a virtue because they have thereby been 
shown to rest on unprincipled grounds. 
 
Figure 4: Success and failures(?) of the topological AIM 
Left: a contour map of the electron density in ethene (C2H4). Black dots indicate the 
saddle point (or “bond critical point”) along the bond paths connecting the atoms. 
(The diamond-forming lines identify, on Bader’s view, interatomic surfaces.) Figure 
taken from (Bader 1990). 
Right: Argon forming sixty bonds paths with its buckeyball cage. Figure taken from 
(Weisberg et al. 2011).  
4.2.3  Philosophical motivations: definiteness & observability 
So far, we have only discussed practical motivations for pursuing the rigor-driven approach to defining 
chemical concepts (as well as some hurdles to achieving these payoffs). There is a different kind of 
motivation also evident among members of this camp, which takes on a more philosophical flavor. 
This is the idea that only by defining concepts in the foregoing manner will chemical theory identify 
the truth of the matter, or so to speak, cut nature at its joints. Conversely, concepts that are not cleanly 
rooted in physical theory are misleading and detrimental to the future of the field. This sentiment can 
be found in many discussions of chemical concepts:  
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“The qualitative (‘hand-waving’) explanations […] are not science (i.e., are nonsense) and should 
consequently be completely discarded. Instead the effort of chemical educators should be expended 
to demonstrate the myriad chemical substances and properties of real matter…” (Ogilvie 1990, p. 
288).56 
“Overcoming the current obstacles [namely that our concepts appear to not be ‘real’] will require 
new methods to describe molecular structure and bonding, just as new concepts were needed before 
the phlogiston theory could be set aside” (Eberhart 2002).57 
“I believe in the existence of a single universe, one in which the laws of physics apply. I do not 
believe in the existence of parallel universes wherein their laws are either ignored or ‘bent’ to 
accommodate personal points of view. […] The universe in which we live is more exciting and 
demanding of our abilities than any that one might care to invent” (Bader 2011).  
 
These statements are not based on empirical evidence in any straightforward way, although this is a 
nuanced issue. While there is presumably no empirical finding that would definitely tell us what counts 
                                                 
 
56 Or about the teaching of qualitative conceptual thinking: “Like the legendary emperor who displayed 
his newest suit of a material so fine as to be invisible, the authors and professors (teachers) who naively 
parrot these old untruths succeed only in exposing their ignorance” (Ogilvie 1990, p. 288). 
57 See also Eberhart & Jones (2013). In both, the attitude is one of acknowledging the importance of 
the traditional (fuzzy) chemical concepts, but insistence that the way forward is to develop ‘quantum 
mechanically correct’ concepts that are able to take over the work of the traditional concepts. 
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as science or what features theorists ought to seek in their conceptual tools, there is a sense in which 
empiricism speaks in favor of the foregoing points of view. Namely, if we seek to develop concepts 
that are observable or directly quantifiable in the physicist’s sense of the term (i.e., possessing a 
corresponding operator 58), then certain ways of defining concepts—including those promoted by 
advocates of the rigor-driven camp—are rightly privileged. This is to say, at stake in these debates is 
the question of whether the concepts are physically observable.  
 
For instance, regarding the charge of an atom in a molecule, Bader’s QTAIM definition is such that 
the charge of an AIM possesses a corresponding operator allowing, in principle, its ‘direct’ 
measurement. So, if we accept the QTAIM conception of the AIM, the properties of an AIM are 
physically observable; or put differently, if we assume good chemical concepts ought to be observable 
in the forgoing fashion, the QTAIM passes the test. According to the vast majority of alternative 
definitions, including the Hirshfeld AIM discussed in the previous chapter, no such operators exist, 
rendering the properties of AIMs according to these conceptions non-observable.59 It is this fact that 
enables Bader to bolster his AIM proposal by asking: do we want to decide on these matters by free 
choice, or by observation? (Bader 2010). 
 
                                                 
 
58 See Bader (2008) for the most in-depth discussion of this point; see especially section 2.2 (pp. 13717-
8). 
59 And further, calculating the charge of an atom in a molecule according to the Hirshfeld conception 
of the AIM requires reference to non-physically motivated reference state: the promolecule. This kind 
of physically unmotivated calculational maneuvering is precisely what advocates of this camp 
disparage.  
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Still, the assumption that concepts ought to be observable in the foregoing manner remains just that—
an assumption about what chemical concepts ought to be. While it is hard to imagine any theorist 
outright resisting this observability in their concepts, there remains debate about what exactly it 
provides, and what kind of sacrifice is appropriate in the pursuit of it. In fact, as we turn now to the 
opposing camp—what I call the understanding-driven camp—it will be clear that many would rather 
sacrifice this observability, as well as the above-mentioned practical payoffs, in order to develop 
concepts that achieve an altogether different aim.  
4.3 Concepts for qualitative understanding 
There are many chemists driven to develop concepts of a very different character, chemists who I 
place in the ‘understanding-driven camp’. The concepts developed and promoted by this camp lack 
many of the features sought after by the opposing camp: they are rarely ‘observable’ in the physicist’s 
sense of the term; they have many different formulations—rather than a single, definitive 
formulation—and these different formulations are often at odds with each other when it comes to 
quantitative matters; they are often not formulated using terms found in the physical equations on 
which computational models are based; and their formulations often make appeals to calculational 
schema that are not independently motivated.  
 
Despite this list of what are arguably shortcomings, the concepts developed by this camp are valued 
for a single, often-stated reason: they facilitate chemical understanding. The nature of this understanding 
can be difficult to parse, and some might regard its answer to be in the domain of psychology. 
However, I have chosen an empirical, or perhaps pragmatic strategy instead: look to see what the 
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concepts—those that are valued for their ability to confer understanding—really allow chemists to do, 
and only then ask what it is in virtue of which the concepts are able to do this.60 Briefly stated, my 
answer, which draws heavily from Hoffmann (1998) and de Regt (2017), is that such concepts—
typically working in conjunction with other chemical concepts—allow chemists to qualitatively explain 
large swathes of chemical data in a generalizable way and without the need for regular reference to the 
results of computer calculations.61 These concepts are able to do this in part because of the flexibility 
purchased by their ‘fuzziness’ (as it is sometimes put), because this flexibility allows the concepts to 
work together in diverse chemical and theoretical settings. These ideas are unpacked below, where I 
hope to make it clear why, in pursuit of this kind of understanding, chemists of this second camp are 
                                                 
 
60 Some theorists of the understanding-driven camp prefer the language of models (e.g., Pauling & 
Herman 1986, Houk and Liu 2014) and others prefer the language of concepts (e.g., Hoffmann 1998; 
Gonthier et al. 2012; Schwarz and Schmidbaur 2012). Though not without exception, the language of 
models is used to describe a particular application of one or several concepts to explain a particular 
chemical phenomenon. I believe the conceptual practices underlying the development of these models 
is the same, and while I will continue to talk of concepts rather than models, I include these modeling 
practices within the scope of my analysis. 
61 As Hoffman puts it, “I define understanding (operationally, if faced with a really good computer 
program and a complex problem), as being able to predict qualitatively (this forces you to think before) 
the result of a calculation before that calculation is carried out. If the calculation’s result differs from 
what your understanding gives you, well then it’s time to think again, do numerical experiments until 
you rationalize (that’s also to ‘understand’) the results” (Hoffmann 1998, p. 3). Henk de Regt puts this 
line of thinking in a theory-oriented account of scientific understanding: “A scientific theory T is 
intelligible for scientists (in context C) if they can recognize qualitatively characteristic consequences 
of T without performing exact calculations” (de Regt 2017). I aim to place this idea in a concept-
oriented account with additional moving parts. 
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led to foster concepts that break from the physical models in ways that otherwise appear stubborn 
and shortsighted. 
 
Again, some clarification on my chosen terminology is in order. I call this group the ‘understanding-
driven camp’ because I believe understanding is the central guiding principle in their evaluation of 
conceptual formulations and their implementations. Though it remains to elaborate on the nature of 
this understanding, I do not mean to suggest that the concepts developed by the rigor-driven camp 
are devoid of this feature; they too may facilitate some understanding in the same manner. The 
different is in the priorities, and this difference manifests in very real ways. For now, put generally: 
this difference in priority manifests in the way various features of a conceptual definition are weighted 
in its evaluation; for example, the extent to which it is acceptable to stray from the physical equations 
in order to make sense of some data will be a point of contention between the two camps.  
 
Also, some clarification on the scope of my analysis. I treat this issue in a modern context, as a debate 
about the proper way to relate longstanding conceptual practices and newer computational models, 
and as such it is a modern topic. While to some extent I examine its historical threads back through 
20th century (Chapter 2), I do not aim to make any claims about its historical origin, or the extent to 
which it differs from any conceptual strategies that might have existed prior to the 20th century. I will 
only say that I believe many of the concerns that guide the two camps discussed here will be present 
in earlier history of chemistry, but that I do not believe the contours of the debate will be the same or 
as localized. That is to say, I believe the advent of computational models, at least those accurate enough 
to have practical application, has intensified and localized the concerns that may or may not be tracible 
well into past chemical and likely physical theory. 
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4.3.1  Practical motivations and their implications 
The motivation for defining concepts in the manner preferred by the understanding-driven camp can 
be found in what is lacking, from their perspective, in the physical equations underlying computational 
models, as well as the concepts based directly thereon. This desideratum is called many different 
things, but I believe it is most clearly captured in the following: cognitively manageable qualitative 
patterns. In short, what their hard-earned concepts provide is the ability to qualitatively predict large 
swaths of chemical data without needing to regularly appeal to the results of computational models.62 
 
The desire for cognitively manageable qualitative patterns can be seen even in the relatively early stages 
of quantum chemistry, particularly clearly in the case of the concept of electronegativity.63 Remember 
that electronegativity was put forth as a measure of the strength with which an atom of a given element 
attracts electrons to itself, and one major strategy for gauging this power was using a comparative 
study of bond energies (Pauling 1932b). Empirical bond energies were, for the most part, restricted to 
simple diatomic molecules, and thus electronegativities had to be assigned on the basis of few data 
points. The resulting electronegativities—Pauling’s values—were widely employed and valued for the 
simple, intuitive explanations they produced; anyone with a basic understanding of chemistry was 
henceforth able to qualitatively order bond energies of simple molecules and likewise with polarity 
                                                 
 
62 I will also speak about this desideratum in terms of a tradeoff between simplicity and the generality 
of qualitative accuracy. The nature of this tradeoff will become clearer when we examine the practices 
used to develop these concepts in the following section. 
63 Parts of this section are reproduced from the previous chapter, tailored here for a different narrative.  
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and other molecular features (see Chapter 2). At the same time, both quantitative and qualitative errors 
began to emerge, especially for complex molecules, and sorting them out would require a more 
nuanced approach to electronegativity. One such addition was the inclusion of considerations of the 
hybridization64 of the atom: in the language of valence bond theory, carbon that is sp3 hybridized (e.g., 
CH4) could then be assigned a different electronegativity value than carbon that is sp2 (C2H4) or sp 
(C2H2) hybridized (Mulliken 1935). This accounted for many errors, but already the concept of 
electronegativity was beginning to lose its simplicity. Here is a nice expression of these concerns in a 
landmark survey on the concept following these developments: 
 
The crucial point, as Evans (1951) has remarked, is that there is the possibility that every molecule 
must needs be treated as a special case. (Is the valence state of nitrogen the same in NH3, in NF3, 
and in N(CH3)3?) The electronegativity concept has been useful in the past largely because it 
denied the need for special treatment of every individual case; thus, the electronegativity of nitrogen 
was considered well enough defined by a single number. This is now questioned […]. It seems clear 
that the further development of the electronegativity theory will attempt to define the range of 
electronegativity open to an atom. There remains the problem of choosing from the range the unique 
value which the atom achieves in a given molecular environment. Unless some comparatively simple 
                                                 
 
64 Note that the language of ‘hybridization’ and ‘valance state’ has historically been inconsistent and 
varies between subfields—sometimes they are equivalent and sometimes not. For our purposes they 
can be treated as the same.   
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criterion of choice can be found...the discomforting possibility that Evans has foreseen may become 
a very real one.  
-Pritchard and Skinner (1955) 
 
The key phrase here is ‘comparatively simple criterion of choice’. While the developments surrounding 
the concept were increasing the precisions with which it could be employed, it was at the same time 
reducing its cognitive manageability: it was becoming less possible to use the concept without the aid 
of, for example, an extensive compiled table that listed the electronegativity of atoms in all the different 
chemical systems in which it can be found.65 The modern version of this concern does not involve 
tables, but rather computers that (re)run calculations—if one wanted to know the electronegativity of 
an atom in a molecule with precision of the modern DFT conception of electronegativity, one would 
have to run a calculation using advanced computational models.  
 
However, losing the ability to predict these values does not alone wholly capture the core of the 
problem. Notice that electronegativity values are valued more for their approximate and relative 
                                                 
 
65 While simple electronegativity tables that assign a single value to each element, such as Pauling’s, do 
involve a table that must be occasionally referenced, it is not difficult to internalize the important 
values; in any case, the difference is one of degree. 
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magnitudes rather than their precise or absolute magnitudes.66 To understand why, it is important to 
consider the qualitative nature of the practices surrounding these concepts. By comparing the 
approximate electronegativity values of the different atoms in a molecule, certain qualitative patterns 
emerge. Some qualitative patterns are rather obvious, such as more electronegative atoms being more 
negatively charged, or more polar bonds existing between atoms with a larger difference in 
electronegativity; other qualitative patterns are less obvious, such as that chemically significant 
hydrogen bonding only occurs when hydrogen is bound to an atom that is more electronegative than 
it is by roughly 0.7, and that adding highly electronegative groups to strained molecules will reduce the 
strain. These patterns are qualitative in the sense than they are formulated in terms of ‘more’ and 
‘less’,67 and they are simple in the sense that they can be stated without a host of exceptions or rules 
for when they hold or need to be adjusted in some fashion. 
 
The crucial point is that the simplicity of these qualitative patterns can be significantly impacted by 
how the concept is defined and thereby quantified. To return to the case at hand, the lamenting 
                                                 
 
66 I am using these terms in what I believe is the common sense manner, but for clarification: the 
degree to which a value is approximate or precise can be evaluated based on how many significant 
figures are present; a value is relative if it is given only in comparison to others (or, which I take to be 
the same, if there is an arbitrary baseline, such as setting the least electronegative atom to a value of 
zero), and a value is absolute if it is given in terms of a reference that is independent in some 
meaningful way (e.g., electronegativity values put in units of energy).  
67 Some of these patterns or rules might be described as ‘semi-quantitative’ (e.g., the hydrogen bonding 
rule above) because they are formulated in terms of approximate numbers. For simplicity and because 
I do not believe there is an important difference to be found here, I will refer to them all as qualitative 
patterns. 
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above—about the possibility that “every molecule must needs be treated as a special case”—is not 
merely due to the need to resort to an extremely large table or a computer calculation to determine an 
atoms electronegativity in a given molecule. Rather, it is due to the fact that the simple qualitative 
patterns, which drew theorists to think in terms of electronegativity, were becoming less simple, more 
difficult to identify using the more physically motivated conception of electronegativity. The newer 
conceptions of electronegativity, which included details of the chemical environment in its calculation, 
were at first glance bringing only slight quantitative corrections to electronegativity values. No, the 
valence state of nitrogen is not exactly the same in NH3, in NF3; it is slightly different, and so too is 
the electronegativity of nitrogen in the two molecules. Considering these quantitative corrections in 
the context of the foregoing qualitative patterns—formulated in terms of ‘more’ and ‘less’—problems 
quickly arise. For example, nitrogen is generally more electronegative than carbon, but how does the 
electronegativity of nitrogen in NH3 compare to the electronegativity of carbon in CF4? The answer 
depends on the magnitude of these small quantitative corrections, and without a ‘simple criterion of 
choice’ that can be used to determine these corrections, the question will have to be put to a 
computational model or extremely large table. It is the obfuscation of the qualitative functionality of 
the concept that is truly lamented. 
 
It is the response to this problem that separates the two camps. On the one hand, there is the attitude 
of those in the rigor-driven camp: why should these corrections be lamented? If you want your 
chemical concepts to survive in the modern era, they should be put in terms that are compatible with 
modern physics. There are compelling and rather natural ways to accomplish this, terms in the physical 
equations that capture the essence of electronegativity (most notably the negative of the chemical 
potential, Chapter 2). To the extent that this reformulation of the concept brings corrections, this 
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should be accepted and even celebrated; things are not as straightforward as previously thought, but 
such is science.  
 
And the opposing response, that of the understanding-driven camp: there is no reason to commit to 
the proposed reformulation of these concepts. These concepts are valued for the simple qualitative 
patterns they track, and accordingly they ought to be defined in whatever way—or even ways—that 
enable them to function in this manner. If these qualitative patterns cannot be identified neatly using 
terms found in the physical equations, this only means the latter is deficient for the task of finding 
them.  
 
It is easy to appreciate how one might reasonably charge such theorists with ignoring or bending 
physical laws to accommodate their preconceived views, as those of the rigor-driven camp have 
repeatedly argued. It is more difficult, but no less important, to appreciate how the traditional use of 
these concepts can be not only maintained, but also further developed despite these challenges ‘from 
below’. As we will see, there are nuanced strategies used to develop concepts that function to identify 
qualitative patterns. To do this, however, the resulting concepts must possess some strange features; 
these features will be examined following a demonstration of how chemical concepts can be jointly 
developed to expand their ability to identify simple qualitative patterns.  
4.3.2  Developing flexible conceptual networks 
To shed further light on the nature of chemical concepts according to the understanding-driven camp, 
I again take a practice-oriented approach: examine how these theorists develop and use their concepts. 
I have already mentioned the central feature that these practices attempt to bestow upon the concepts 
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they develop, namely the ability to qualitatively predict large swaths of chemical data in a simple, 
cognitively manageable manner. In order to develop concepts capable of doing this, liberties are taken 
when it comes to interpreting both empirical and computational results; namely, the concepts used to 
interpret these results are molded to fit the job. These liberties are justified on the basis that, according 
to members of this camp, the concepts are not tied to any physical basis or even single set of empirical 
results. Put differently, the quantification of the concept is underdetermined by theoretical and 
empirical commitments, and the concepts can therefore can be cast to track certain trends in the data. 
 
This underdetermination is nicely illustrated by the case of atomic charge being underdetermined by 
dipole moment (which for most purposes can be directly measured by empirical means). This is 
discussed nicely in Gonthier et al. (2012, p. 4675):  
 
Dipole moments are the most legitimate probe of atomic charges for polar molecules; however, 
assigning atomic charges based on measured molecular dipole moments is unrealistic. An atom 
inside a molecule does not possess a spherical distribution of charge, and its resulting atomic 
polarization may oppose or enhance the charge transfer dipole (i.e., the dipole moment deduced from 
the atomic charges). In other words, a small value for the experimental dipole moment is equally 
compatible with both large atomic charges and large atomic polarization or with small atomic 
charges and small atomic polarization. 
 
Thus, what appears to be the closest we can get to empirically measuring the charge of an atom in a 
molecule—using dipole moments—does not commit us to a certain quantification when it comes 
time to assign charges to the atoms in the molecule. An assumption underlying this passage, one which 
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is attacked by advocates of the rigor-driven approach, is that physical theory likewise does not commit 
one to certain atomic charge values, that it to underdetermines their quantification. For now, we will 
set aside this dispute to examine how, in the presence of this underdetermination, chemists of the 
understanding-driven camp decide on certain quantification for atomic charges.  
 
In chapter two, we examined in detail two density-based proposals for how one might identify the 
atom in the molecule (AIM) for the purposes of quantifying atomic charge: the stockholder AIM 
(Hirshfeld 1977), and the topological AIM (Bader 1990) (see Chapter 2 for technical details). The two 
schemes partition the electron density of molecules into very different AIMs, as can be seen below 
for one of the nitrogen atoms in N2. In this example, given the symmetry of the molecule, they happen 
to agree on the charge assigned to the two nitrogen atoms (zero); however, in most cases they will 
assign different charges to the atoms in the molecule, and in complex systems they may even 
disagreeing on which atoms are positively charged and which are negatively charged.  
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Figure 5: Two ways of identifying the atom in the molceule (revisited) 
Two different partition schemes as applied to a single nitrogen atom in N2 (stockholder 
AIM on left, topological AIM on right). In each of the three images, the two ‘+’s 
represent the nuclei in the molecule, and the contour lines display the electron density. 
The two images on the bottom show the electron density assigned to the atom on the 
‘left’ of the molecule according to the two competing schemes (Adapted from 
Davidson and Chakravorty 1992, p. 321).    
 
The question then arises: how should chemists choose between these two partition schemes? Where 
those of the rigor-driven camp are guided by considerations about which one is more motivated by 
physical theory, the understanding-driven camp follows a very different approach.68 Here, the goal is 
to choose a partition scheme that is consistent with other concepts that are likewise employed for the 
purpose of making qualitative patterns accessible. For example, another concept that intuitively ought 
                                                 
 
68 “Unlike theories, the justification of concepts is provided by their success in applications rather than 
in firm proofs” (Gonthier et al. 2012, p. 4672). I hope to shed light on specifically what counts as a 
successful application.  
 88 
to come into play in discussion of atomic charge is electronegativity. Atoms in the molecule that have 
a greater “power to attract electrons to themselves” (Pauling 1939, p. 58) should, other things being 
equal, have a more negative charge. This, anyway, is how the concept is intended to work, and this 
intention can be realized if the right charge partition scheme is selected. Accordingly, one approach 
used to select a partition scheme is to test how well it conforms to these expectations relating to 
electronegativity considerations.  
 
 
Figure 6: Hirshfeld AIM charge test 
Charges correspond to the hydrogen atoms shown in bold (adapted from Saha et al. 
2009, p. 1795).  
* deviations from the expected trend. 
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Above are the results from one such test, where the stockholder partition scheme is tested for its 
ability to reproduce expected ‘through bond’ effects of electronegativity.69 All molecules considered 
in the test are hydrocarbon chains with one or more electronegative functional group(s) at one end of 
the chain. The stockholder charge of the emboldened hydrogen atoms, located on the end opposite 
the functional group, are shown in the right column. The expectation is that, other things being equal, 
the closer or more electronegative the functional group, the more positive the charge of the hydrogen. 
Of the dozen molecules tested, two deviated from expectation (indicated by an asterisk). For example, 
comparing the third row with the first two, it was expected that the hydrogen atoms become less 
positively charged as the electronegative hydroxyl groups become farther away; yet for some reason, 
the positive charge increased, and this counts as a point against the stockholder partition scheme.  
 
Note that the absolute magnitude of the assigned charges is not particularly important in these tests. 
Rather, it would be enough that the charges are qualitatively accurate with regards to the set of molecules 
considered, correctly assigning charges that recapitulate the expected trends—and keep in mind, it is 
these trends on which the other concepts involved in the test (in this case electronegativity) are also 
based. In this way, a successful test affirms the qualitative accuracy of all concepts involved in the 
tests. Also note that the foregoing test only incorporates two concepts; more thorough tests would 
hopefully (though see below) show that the results are qualitatively accurate with regard to other 
concepts, such as bond strength and nucleophilicity. Performing these more thorough tests would put 
                                                 
 
69 This effect is distinguished from ‘through space’ charge transfer, which in the present cases should 
be negligible given the linear structure of the molecules.  
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the conceptual description of these molecules in contact with additional empirical features besides 
polarity. 
 
What ideally results, then, is a network of concepts that allows chemists to predict the qualitative 
properties of molecules and which is simple enough to be employed without needing to regularly 
resort to computational models.70 This, I argue, is what it takes to possess chemical understanding.  
 
Computational models and this conceptual network can be thought of as two frameworks for dealing 
with chemical systems, illustrated below. The conceptual network can be thought of as a lossy 
compression of the computational models, but one that preserves what is needed for chemical 
understanding. In this way, the two frameworks share a point of conversion, where they speak about 
the same things—namely, qualitative empirical features of molecules and other chemical systems—
and agree in their assessment. For example, both frameworks can be used to calculate relative dipole 
moments, reactivities, and energies, and they should agree on these matters despite very different ways 
of coming these shared conclusions. 
                                                 
 
70 In complex molecules, there will always be the need to run a calculation to get a handle on even the 
simplified picture that uses traditional concepts. However, as long as the concepts are working as they 
ought to, a single calculation submitted to the computer should shed light on many related molecules 
in a qualitative manner.  
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Figure 7: Computational model vs. network of chemical concepts 
The framework of a computational model (left) and the conceptual framework of 
traditional chemical theory (right) share point of framework intersection. The concepts 
employed by the conceptual network are intuitive and cognitively manageable, while 
those in the computational model are not.71 
 
However, sometimes these tests do not go as one might hope, sometimes proposed procedures for 
quantifying traditional chemical concepts do not perform as expected. Such an outcome has already 
been shown in Figure 6, where several assigned charges were, qualitatively speaking, the opposite of 
what was expected. This is to say that, to some degree—and this typically is a matter of degree—the 
Hirshfeld partition scheme failed to assign atomic charges in a manner consistent with the rest of the 
                                                 
 
71 The terms found in the computational model (currently represented by “…”) will vary depend on 
what, exactly, we consider to be the computational model. We may consider them the terms found in 
the intractable Schrödinger equation, we may consider them the terms found in its also intractable 
DFT solution (as would many of the rigor-driven camp), or we may consider them the terms found 
in the tractable approximations to the former equations. For my purposes, it does not matter because 
none of these terms offer what traditional chemical concepts offer, and in virtue of which they 
facilitate ‘chemical understanding’.  
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operative conceptual network (with a focus here on electronegativity). In such cases, work is put into 
developing a new partition scheme (or generally speaking, into a new technique for quantifying 
traditional concepts). This may be a slight modification to the calculational procedure, as has been 
done several times for the Hirshfeld scheme (mentioned in Chapter 2), or it may be an altogether 
different approach. 
 
In the absence of a quantification technique that performs with qualitative accuracy across all chemical 
systems—and we often find ourselves here—another strategy may be adopted in the meantime: 
different quantification techniques may be adopted for different classes of molecule. For example, if 
one technique performs well for most organic molecules, and another for most inorganic molecules, 
then simply use the techniques within their respective domains. In fact, this was precisely the outcome 
and recommendation of Saha et al. (2009) in the study introduced above. This practice of adopting a 
pluralistic approach to the quantification of chemical concepts certainly has its downsides (examined 
below) but makes sense in light of the ultimate aim of these investigations: to extend the generality 
and qualitative accuracy of the conceptual network that forms the basis of chemical understanding. 
Achieving this aim may require some strange maneuvering when it comes to developing the concepts 
within the network, but according to the understanding-driven camp the price is acceptable.  
 
We now turn to an examination of the nature of the concepts that form this network.  
4.3.3  Willingness to embrace the strangeness of ‘fuzzy’ chemical concepts 
In the previous section we got clearer on what it is that facilitates chemical understanding: a network 
of concepts that are tailored to track qualitative patterns in chemical data. We also saw how this 
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tailoring is carried out, developing and testing a multitude of proposals for how one might connect 
the chemical concepts to the physical models, and adopting whichever method(s) best tracks the 
relevant qualitative patterns dictated by other concepts within the network. While tracking the 
important qualitative patterns is the goal, the concepts that are able to do this possess other features 
that are not intrinsic to their intended functionality, but which are accepted as a means to an end; they 
might be considered side effects. These side effects include some rather strange features, which we 
examine here.  
 
We have already seen how the practices examined in the previous section can lead to one such feature: 
pluralism. In the pursuit of being able to quantify their concepts in a way that is consistent with the 
relevant parts of their conceptual network, it is common to employ different quantification schemes 
for different domains of chemistry. As these quantification schemes are what make the connection 
between the chemical concepts and the physical models, this practice precludes the possibility of 
offering a singular physical definition of the chemical concept. This is not merely because there is 
more than one way to say the same thing; the different schemes for quantifying these concepts offer 
different numbers, both in terms of the absolute values as well as how values assigned to different 
molecules compare to each other. Indeed, it is precisely because they offer different numbers that they 
are applied to different domains of chemistry.  
 
Another related feature of many of these concepts is their unobservability. As discussed above, for many 
chemical concepts there are proposals for how to relate them to the physical models in such a way 
that renders the concepts physically observable in the quantum mechanical sense of having 
corresponding operators (see Bader 2005 for mathematical details in this context). Where these 
proposals are championed by those of the rigor-driven camp, those of the understanding-driven camp 
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are not averse to concepts being physical observable so much as they are indifferent to it. Use is made 
of quantification schemes that correspond to physical observables as well as those that do not, and 
this difference does not weigh into their evaluation, which again, focuses on their ability to track 
qualitative trends in the data. In defense of this practice, these concepts have been called Kantian 
noumena, “conceptual constructs ultimately unknowable by observation or unique definition but 
conceivable by reason” (Parr et al. 2005). Note, though, that the context of this philosophical 
discussion strongly suggests this point is put forward only as a defense, and not a driving force of 
these practices. 
 
More generally, those of the understanding-driven camp are far more permissive when it comes to 
giving a quantification scheme the light of day. When confronted with a proposal for how one might 
quantify traditional concepts in terms of modern computational models, there is little that would 
prevent its evaluation with regard to capturing the intended qualitative trends. This also includes 
permitting the use of quantification schemes that make use of ad hoc reference structures. A prominent 
example of this is the Hirshfeld AIM partition scheme and its subsequent iterations (Hirshfeld 1977; 
Vanpoucke et al. 2013). The ‘promolecule’ that is required for calculating atomic charges according to 
this scheme is a hypothetical molecule with atoms whose electrons do not interact in any way, but 
which is an essential reference point in order to carry out the calculations needed to determine 
Hirshfeld charges (see chapter 2 for details). Not only does this structure not exist in nature, but it is 
not theoretically motivated for any reason other than its role in a scheme that decompose molecules 
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into atoms that are pleasing to chemists.72 Further, when problems are found with the Hirshfeld 
scheme, changes are proposed to this reference structure and the calculation based thereon in order 
to find a better quantification scheme (Bultinck et al. 2007, Vanpoucke et al. 2013). 
 
Accepting these conceptual features—pluralism, unobservability, and the use of ad hoc reference 
structures—allows chemists the flexibility that is often needed to develop a conceptual network 
capable of tracking important qualitative trends using simple concepts. It is precisely this flexibility 
that those of the rigor-driven camp criticize, arguing that these practices only serve to affirm 
presuppositions about the behavior of these concepts and their role in explaining chemical 
phenomena. However, I hope to have shown that the two camps are playing very different games, 
with very different standards of success. 
                                                 
 
72 One might think this statement is unfair—after all, the promolecule might be conceived as an 
approximation to the molecular electron density where certain electron-electron interactions have 
been ignored. However, which electron-electron interactions are ignored is carefully selected (namely 
those from different atoms) in order to influence the result, that is, to get pleasing atoms in the 
molecule.  
Alternatively, one might say there is theoretical motivation to consider the promolecule because it 
minimizes the information loss, as expressed by the Kullback-Liebler measure, during the formation 
of the molecule (Kullback 1959, Parr et al. 2005). But again, this information loss is measured between 
the electron density of the promolecule and the actual molecule, and hence its significance rests on 
that of the promolecule.  
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5.0 Extending the Implications and the Future of Philosophy of Chemistry 
The aim of this final chapter is to explore the future of philosophy of chemistry. I argue that, in light 
of the above discussion of chemical concepts, drawing on chemical practice to feed investigations of 
the ontological status of chemical concepts—a rather common exercise among philosophers of 
chemistry—is misguided. I go on to suggest several lines of philosophical inquiry that promise fruit 
and which are genuinely aligned with scientific practice in chemistry. These include exploring what 
concepts built for qualitative understanding can and cannot do.  
5.1 Introduction 
Philosophy of chemistry has not flourished—both in terms of its ability to attract students and  its 
contributions to broader issues in philosophy of science—and I turn now to prospects for its future. 
Above I hope to have made a compelling case that theoretical chemists working in the computational 
era encounter problems relating to conceptual development that are philosophical in nature. They are 
tasked with developing concepts without a clearly stated account of what, precisely, these concepts 
are supposed to accomplish, and the absence of clearly stated standards of evaluation has sustained 
the longstanding debates explored above. In discussing the practice of computationally guided 
conceptual development—where the goal is to develop a network of concepts that are qualitatively 
accurate across large swathes of chemistry in a way that is consistent with one another—I hope to 
have clarified some standards of conceptual evaluation that one might reasonably hold. 
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However, setting my specific proposal aside, the problem area I have identified has implications for 
philosophy of chemistry. The implications are in part restrictive: appreciating the fact that there is 
genuine debate among chemists about what chemical concepts are intended to do means that certain 
approaches to philosophy of chemistry cannot get off the ground.  More specifically, the presence of 
this debate among chemists means that investigations into the ontological status of chemical concepts 
cannot be properly grounded in scientific practice without first engaging the very same issues that 
divide chemists, and for the very fact that these issues have ontological implications. The implications 
are also, I hope to show, fruitful: appreciating the very same debate among chemists opens up several 
avenues worthy of philosophical consideration that hold the potential to be helpful to chemists and 
offer philosophers of chemistry an opportunity to develop a unique contribution to philosophy of 
science.  
 
I begin this chapter with the critical component, arguing that perhaps the largest ongoing literature in 
the philosophy of chemistry—about the nature of the chemical bond—is fundamentally misguided 
for the above stated reasons, and that philosophers of chemistry should instead focus their attention 
on the philosophical issues that are motivated within chemical practice. I proceed to identify two 
open-ended questions worthy of philosophical pursuit. One is immediately practical: characterizing 
the limitations of concepts built for qualitative understanding. By abstracting away from longstanding 
conceptual debates among chemists, these limitations can be identified. The second question is more 
abstract, but likewise attuned to philosophical training: characterizing the auxiliary functions of 
chemical concepts. I hope to show that these fuzzy, ill-defined concepts that lack a certain sense of 
rigor are able to do additional things for the chemical community in virtue of these same features. 
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5.2 Misguided philosophical pursuits and the nature of the chemical bond 
I have made it most of the way through a dissertation on the nature of chemical concepts without 
making much contact with the current literature in the philosophy of chemistry that focuses on just 
that: the nature of chemical concepts. I would now like to broach this literature in order to show how 
the foregoing chapters suggest an alternative direction for philosophy of chemistry. Having waited so 
long, the groundwork for my case is already set.  
 
Witness the debate among philosophers of chemistry about the nature of the chemical bond. This 
literature begins with the observation that the concept of the chemical bond has been difficult to 
articulate precisely in quantum mechanical terms (Hendry 2008)—(which generally speaking was our 
starting point, too)—and proceeds to explore a variety of ways the bond might be conceived and how 
these conceptions stand in the face of quantum mechanics. However, the alternative conceptions of 
the bond under consideration are not what you might expect given our historical foray of chapter 2.73 
Instead, it is the ‘structural’, ‘energetic’, and ‘interactionist’ conceptions of the bond that are vetted for 
their compatibility with quantum mechanics (Hendry 2008; Weisberg 2008; Hettema 2008; Weisberg, 
Needham, and Hendry 2011; Esser 2018). To elaborate, the structural conception of the bond asserts 
                                                 
 
73 I have not focused on the concept of the chemical bond, in part to make a case for the generality of 
this phenomenon, but by now it should come as no surprise that chemists are engaged in debate about 
the proper way to conceive of the bond just as they are about the proper way to conceive of 
electronegativity or the atom in the molecule. See Gonthier et al. (2012) for orientation.  
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that bonds are “material parts of the molecule that are responsible for spatially localized sub-molecular 
relationships between individual atomic centers” (Hendry 2008, p.917); the energetic conception holds 
that facts about bonding are “just facts about energy changes between molecular or super-molecular 
states” (Hendry 2008, p.919); and the newer interactionist conception holds that “Bonding is a special 
physical relationship between pairs of atoms in a molecule where displacement (within limits) leads to 
particular restorative responses within the molecular framework” (Esser 2018 pp.16-17). The game, 
then, is to see which of these conceptions can be maintained given what quantum mechanics says 
about chemical systems; for example, the structural conception apparently struggles to account for the 
fact that greater delocalization of electrons stabilizes the molecule (Weisberg 2008).  
 
I argue this philosophical undertaking is fundamentally misguided both in the question it seeks to 
answer and in the manner it draws from chemistry to answer it. Note first that it is the philosophers 
who brought the three options—the candidate conceptions of the chemical bond—to the table; 
debate among chemists about the proper conception of the chemical bond is not put in terms of the 
‘structural’, ‘energetic’, and ‘interactionist’ conceptions of the bond, and it is unclear how the bonding 
models chemists do discuss are supposed to map onto these distinctions.74 But even more 
problematically, chemists are in fact engaged in substantial debate about the proper way to conceive 
of the bond. Amidst debate about whether the chemical bond can be identified with a single bonding 
model (see Bader 2009 in favor; Grimme et al. 2009 against), surveys of when different conceptions 
                                                 
 
74 It strikes me as difficult to find a bonding model discussed in the chemical literature that does not 
involve ‘structural’, ‘energetic’ and ‘interactionist’ components. Why one of these components should 
be deemed the true nature of the bond is puzzling.  
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of the bond might be appropriate (Gonthier et al. 2012), and discussion of bonds being the ‘unicorns’ 
of theoretical chemistry (as Frenking and Krapp 2007 have colorfully argued),  how are philosophers 
supposed to pick a bonding model to use as their scientific reference point? And note the great impact 
this decision makes. If one draws from Richard Bader (1990) for an understanding of where the 
concept stands in chemistry (as does Esser 2018),  one may get a very different impression than if one 
draws from Roald Hoffman (1998). The alternative of doing a robustness analysis (Weisberg 2008) 
likewise does not do justice to the disagreements among chemists. In the preceding chapters, I hope 
to have shown that these disagreements are in fact substantial, and precisely about what kind of a 
thing chemical concepts are. 
 
I am not suggesting that philosophers of chemistry must await consensus among chemists before 
there can be grounds for a philosophy of chemistry—just the opposite. The problem is to pursue the 
investigation of the ontological status of the bond in way that presupposes a resolution to ongoing 
(and dare I say philosophical) debate among theoretical chemists. Greater still, these are pressing 
questions for chemistry that philosophers are trained to address. More and clearer dialogue (and if 
possible, agreement) surrounding how theoretical chemists make progressive conceptual 
developments in the era of computational chemistry…this is both philosophical and active.  
 
Perhaps the problem has been that philosophers seeking to do philosophy of chemistry were under 
the impression that if there was going to be a philosophy of chemistry, then they would have to bring 
the philosophy. Prior to weighing the merit of the structuralist conception of the chemical bond, 
Weisberg (2008) comments:  
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“Most commonly, chemists adopt a pragmatic stance and simply demand that bonding theories be 
useful for making predictions and aiding in the synthesis of new molecules. The underlying 
ontological status of the bond holds little interest. Although useful to everyday chemical practice, 
this approach is deeply unsatisfying to the philosopher of chemistry because it leaves unanswered 
fundamental questions about the nature of the chemical bond” (Weisberg 2008, p.2). 
 
What I find deeply unsatisfying is the idea that the nuanced epistemological considerations examined 
in the previous chapters of this dissertation should be deemed mere pragmatics. They are the 
substance of modern theoretical chemistry, and merit the attention of philosophers—not least because 
they have clear implications for questions about ontology, reduction, and pluralism. Furthermore, 
being problems native to chemistry, they are a foothold for philosophers of chemistry to prove that 
chemistry deserves attention beyond being testing ground for ideas generated elsewhere in philosophy 
of science.  
 
In what follows, I continue the exploration of concepts built for qualitative understanding by assessing 
their limitations and strengths. This analysis is preliminary, and my greater aim is to develop the case 
that the epistemological maneuvers involved in developing concepts for qualitative understanding 
carry with them rich philosophical implications about chemistry. 
5.3 Limitations of concepts built for qualitative understanding: the strain case study 
The goal of the practice of computationally guided conceptual development, as motivated in Chapter 
2 and outlined in Chapter 3, is to develop a network of simple concepts that each possess qualitative 
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accuracy across large swathes of relevant chemistry. Although the concepts in this network might 
address very different features or behavior of chemical systems, they must be consistent with each 
other if chemists are to use them to tell qualitative stories. In order to obtain this consistency, concepts 
are occasionally quantified by several different procedures (and we observed this kind of pluralism 
above with regard to the concept of the atom in the molecule). In this way the concept is engaged in 
a multifaceted balancing act: on the one hand, no more complicated than necessary in order to pick 
out a qualitative trend, and on the other hand, defined in such a way (or ways) that its qualitative 
behavior is compatible with related concepts. 
 
While I am resistant to quick turns to prescriptive philosophy of science, my account does suggest 
implications that have practical consequences for conceptual development in chemistry. Below I 
explore one such implication: some questions that deal with concepts built for qualitative 
understanding are inherently resistant to a clear answer due to limitations of such concepts. To explore 
this idea, I make use of a brief case study that centers on the barrier to rotation of ethane. This case 
study is useful because the question being asked—whether the barrier to rotation is due more to strain 
or more to hyperconjugation—involves the direct interaction of two concepts, and for this reason the 
question is conceptually precarious. Additionally, there are fewer concerns about the ‘real’ way to 
quantify these concepts, which simplifies the case study in a way that serves our present aim. 75 
                                                 
 
75 For example,  ”Nature does not know steric hindrance, only energy changes” (Fernández, Frenking, 
and Uggerud 2010). 
 103 
5.3.1  The barrier to rotation of ethane 
Ethane consists of two methyl moieties connected by a carbon-carbon single bond, and because single 
bonds admit rotation, the ethane molecule is capable of conformational change. The two 
conformations we care about are the staggered and eclipsed conformations (Figure 8) for it is the 
energy difference between these conformations that determines the barrier to rotation.  
 
Since the 1930s, experimental and theoretical data have agreed on the magnitude of this barrier: the 
staggered conformation is about 2.9 kcal/mole more stable than the eclipsed conformation (Pitzer & 
Kemp 1936). The initial explanation for this rotational barrier was strain: in the eclipsed conformation, 
each C—H bond is ‘cis’ with another bond on the neighboring atom, and these filled atomic orbitals 
will resist close proximity due to a) the Pauli exclusion principle, and b) classical Coulombic repulsion. 
It was generally accepted that “strain” captures the sum of these two forces. Soon after, the idea of 
hyperconjugation was explored as a possible alternative explanation by Robert Mulliken (1939). In 
short, hyperconjugation occurs when there is partial bonding interaction between bonding and anti-
bonding orbitals. This stabilizing interaction requires a suitable orbital orientation, and in ethane this 




Figure 8: Two conformations of the ethane molecule. 
Left, hyperconjugation: in the staggard conformation, electron density from a C—H σ 
bond may be donated to the σ* (antibonding orbital) of a C—H bond on the adjacent 
carbon; this sharing requires the σ and σ* be ‘anti’ to each other, as they are in the 
staggered conformation, and lowers the overall energy of the molecule.  
Right, strain: in the eclipsed conformation, no significant hyperconjugation is possible, 
and eclipsed C—H bonds are sterically stressed.  
Corresponding Newman projections are shown below each 3D model. 
 
In 1939 Mulliken judged that hyperconjugation in ethane—even in the staggered conformation—
would be negligible, and for the most part textbooks would agree with him throughout the 20th 
century. Still, Frank Weinhold and others (Brunck & Weinhold 1979, Reed et al. 1988, Reed & 
Weinhold 1991) persistently pushed the idea that hyperconjugation was a more significant factor, and 
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many others remained uncertain.76 Then in 2001, Pophristic and Goodman published results showing 
that hyperconjugation wholly accounted for the barrier to rotation, and that, in fact, there was no strain 
present in the eclipsed conformation. Since then, there has been continued debate (Weinhold 2001, 
Schreiner 2002, Bickelhaupt et al. 2003),77 but little consensus (see Mo 2011 for discussion).  
 
So it is that after nearly 90 years of knowing the magnitude of the barrier to rotation, there remains 
debate about the proper way to use chemical concepts to account for it. This persistence may be partly 
due to the very same debate about the proper function of chemical concepts explored in the previous 
chapter; needless to say, there are a multitude of ways both strain and hyperconjugation can be 
quantified (see Gonthier et al. 2012 for orientation). However, in this case, I argue there is a more 
                                                 
 
76 "Despite the extensive studies which have been made on a large number of molecules, it is still true 
that the theory of the origin of these potential barriers is not very far advanced" (Wilson 1959); "While 
it is easy enough to show that the barrier is not due to these special effects, it is more difficult to sort 
out of the mass of information a simple explanation of what the barrier is due to" (Cignitti & Allen 
1964); "Despite the many theoretical papers published, no general agreement has yet been reached on 
an explanation for such barriers" (Lowe 1973). "So far, these attempts have led to rather negative 
conclusions, that is, many effects have been found to be not responsible for the barrier, but it has not 
been possible to pinpoint a simple explanation of what causes the barrier" (Veillard 1974). See (Bruck 
& Weinhold 1979) for this collection of quotes and citations therein. 
77  “When will chemistry textbooks begin to serve as aids, rather than barriers, to this enriched 
quantum-mechanical perspective on how molecular turnstiles work?” (Weinhold 2001); “The 
convenience of visually pleasing explanations for intricate chemical phenomena must not outweigh 
proper physical descriptions” (Schreiner 2002).  
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instructive story to be told, one that highlights an important limitation of concepts developed for 
qualitative understanding. 
5.3.2  Intractable questions: an implication of working with concepts developed for 
qualitative understanding 
My foregoing account of chemical concepts sheds light on why this debate has resisted a clean 
resolution, and why questions such as these—whether strain or hyperconjugation is more responsible 
for the barrier to rotation—are problematic when concepts are developed in the manner of the 
understanding-driven camp. In short, this type of question demands a quantitative functionality of the 
concepts that was sacrificed during the course of their development.  
 
Note first, if it is assumed that concepts behave in the manner the rigor-driven camp thinks they 
should, this question is straightforward, and there ought to be a clear answer. According to this manner 
of conceptual development, concepts should have a clean and singular connection to the underlying 
physical models, making their quantification unambiguous and as accurate as the model itself. As such, 
answering the question about which concept is more responsible for the barrier to rotation in ethane 
should be as simple as carrying out these quantifications and comparing the resulting numbers.78 
 
                                                 
 
78 To be more specific, it should be a matter of quantifying strain in both the staggered and eclipsed 
conformations with the most physically motivated conceptions, and comparing the difference to the 
corresponding difference for hyperconjugation.  
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Matters are not so simple when concepts are developed to serve the aims of the understanding-driven 
camp. According to their preferred mode of conceptual development, the function of a chemical 
concept is first and foremost to track a qualitative trend in chemical data. It has done this when it can 
be used to generate a correct ordering of the relevant chemical data, allowing chemists to use the value 
of the concept to qualitatively predict some chemical properties or behavior (as electronegativity 
values can be used to predict relative bond strengths, relative polarity, etc.). In achieving this end, 
simplicity is sometimes opted for over precise quantification (also evident in the history of 
electronegativity). Besides this desideratum, additional constraints for conceptual development come 
from analyses of how its behavior qualitatively interacts with other chemical concepts that are believed 
to capture related properties (as AIM concepts were evaluated based on their qualitative compatibility 
with electronegativity considerations).  
 
 This mode of conceptual development leads to difficulty in answering the foregoing question about 
the barrier to rotation in ethane. The concept of strain allows for the qualitative assessment that the 
eclipsed conformation will be more strained, and therefore higher in energy, than the staggered 
conformation; similarly, the concept of hyperconjugation allows for the qualitative assessment that 
the staggered conformation will be more conjugated, and therefore lower in energy, than the eclipsed 
conformation. This is to say, both concepts corroborate the same qualitative assessment: the staggered 
conformation is more stable. In order to distinguish their relative contributions to this energy 
difference, however, it is required that we have an accepted quantitative measure of these concepts, 




One might argue: yes, the understanding-driven camp prioritizes the generality of qualitative accuracy, 
but their concepts do allow for quantification—this is precisely what the various conceptions of their 
concepts do. Therefore, assessing the relative contribution of strain and hyperconjugation is as simple 
as figuring out which conception is appropriate for the respective concepts, and then simply 
comparing numbers. But in this case, how is one supposed to determine the appropriate conception 
of the respective concepts? In general, this would be done by determining which conception best 
tracks expected trends in other qualitative concepts (as we saw Saha et al. 2009 doing in Section 3.3). 
But what set of molecules will be used to make these assessments? Acyclic hydrocarbons would be a 
natural choice, but strain and hyperconjugation are present in all of them, making for a rather 
intractable situation.79 
 
One might consider this conceptual conundrum a strike against the conceptual development 
advocated by the understanding-driven camp. Is it not reasonable to expect our concepts to be 
applicable with quantitative precision? Perhaps it is, and perhaps the effort to develop energy 
decomposition analyses (see Fernández 2018 for introduction) that are aligned with the rigor-driven 
camp is a worthwhile effort that may pay off eventually. However, it is worth asking what is lost in 
giving up questions of this sort. Are chemists not in a fine position to use the concepts of strain and 
hyperconjugations for qualitative comparisons between different chemical system, as they currently 
                                                 
 
79 The alternative of doing an energy decomposition analysis—and most attempts to settle this debate 
fall into this category—generally struggles to satisfy the aims of the understanding-driven camp, and 
for this reason struggles to generate widely accepted answers to questions such as this about the barrier 
to rotation in ethane.  
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can for the two conformations of ethane? At the very least, however, it is important to appreciate the 
different elements at play in the question of the barrier to rotation of ethane so that these longstanding 
debates might become less acrimonious and the true contours of the debate become clearer.  
5.4 Auxiliary functions of concepts built for qualitative understanding 
The discussion so far has focused on the practice of developing chemical concepts, especially the less 
familiar approach of the understanding-driven camp. In the previous section we saw one downside of 
concepts so developed: questions that rely on their quantitative comparison cannot be expected to 
have clean answers, and are liable to longstanding disagreements unless properly recognized as 
problematic. The present section briefly explores several upsides of concepts developed for qualitative 
understanding. Besides being qualitatively accurate across large swathes of chemistry, the concepts 
developed by the understanding-driven approach are better able to i) facilitate meta-discussion about 
computational models, and ii) guide the development of more accurate and more interpretable 
computational models. 
 
I broach these topics not to provide a definite account of how the concepts are able to achieve this 
broader functionality, but as an indication of several philosophical problem areas native to chemistry 
on which philosophers of chemistry ought to focus their attention. These auxiliary functions of 
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concepts developed for qualitative understanding can also be viewed as points in favor of the 
understanding-driven camp’s approach to conceptual development. 80 
5.4.1  Concepts able to facilitate discourse about the many models of computational 
chemistry 
The conceptual flexibility employed by the understanding driven camp allows them to maintain 
familiar conceptual behavior: bonds exist where they always have according to structural chemistry, 
electronegativity remains a qualitative predictor of atomic charge, and so on. Where a critic might 
charge them with merely affirming their presuppositions about the behavior of these concepts and 
their role in explaining chemical phenomena, this consistency with past theory has significant benefits 
in terms of both maintaining straightforward relevance of past chemical research and maintaining a 
relatively simple conceptual educational program.81 
 
                                                 
 
80 Though perhaps these functions are not ‘auxiliary’ at all. In the given context, the several virtues of 
concepts developed by the understanding-driven camp appear to be coextensive, making it difficult 
to disentangle their respective appeal to chemists. Because the virtues discussed in the previous 
chapter have received the most attention, I treat them as the primary appeal, though with some 
uncertainty on my part.  
81 It would be a mistake to say, though it sometimes is said, that chemists of the understanding-driven 
camp fail to extract ‘understanding’ from the computational models or the concepts of the rigor-
driven camp due to their being unfamiliar with quantum mechanics (e.g., see Ogilvie 1990, Bader 1999, 
and Matta et al. 2006). This simply is not the case, though it is indicative of the divisiveness of the 
issue. 
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Perhaps more interestingly, concepts of this kind also enable meta-discussion about computational 
models. To appreciate this, first note the wide variety of models currently in use (gestured at in Chapter 
1). To approximate the Schrödinger equation—the central task of most computational models in 
chemistry—approaches based in density functional theory have become widespread in the past 
decade, but there remain many others (see Cramer 2004 ch.7-8). Furthermore, DFT-based approaches 
encompass many different implementations that make different approximations, and these models 
cannot be neatly ordered by their accuracy because model accuracy is often a function of the class of 
chemistry being explored. On top of all of this, the choice of basis set provides additional variation in 
how the model crafts the shape of the wave function, and this choice is non-trivial both in terms of 
performance and whether the model provides a reliable means of rescuing chemical concepts.82 
 
With this plethora of models at play among the chemical community, it is important—perhaps 
essential—to have some way to discuss how the different models perform in terms of chemical 
concepts, for these concepts often frame the research being carried out. Perhaps one is investigating 
how a certain complex might be stabilized by charge transfer: one should seek a model that generates 
reasonable atomic charges; or perhaps one is investigating the role of dispersion interaction in 
facilitating a supramolecular process: one should seek a model that accurately captures this interaction. 
It is for this reason that model performance is often evaluated in terms of their ability to capture 
                                                 
 
82 One striking example is the use of a model to generate Mulliken (orbital-based) atomic charges. 
More realistic charges are generated when the model uses a small basis set, which in almost all cases 
sacrifices model accuracy in other ways (see Cramer 2004 section 9.1.3.2). Again it is worth noting 
that what is deemed ‘realistic’ involves presupposition about the way the concepts ought to behave.  
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behavior or energies that correspond to the same concepts that frame investigation. For example, 
DFT-based approaches are known to be inaccurate for systems where dispersion interaction energy 
is important (Grimme and Steinmetz 2013).83 
 
It is the flexibility of concepts developed for understanding that allows for this meta-discussion about 
computational models. One notable downside of defining concepts in the manner of the rigor-driven 
camp is that they are—by their very definition—tied to certain modeling practices. For example, if 
bonding interaction was strictly identified with the localized orbitals of valence bond theory, or even 
with the delocalized orbitals of molecular orbital theory, then we would be unable to read off bonding 
interactions from models based on density functional theory, which do not possess the appropriate 
two electron orbitals. Put differently, the natural way to recover these concepts from one 
computational model will differ from the natural way to recover it from another, and some ‘fuzziness’ 
is required to relate the performance of different models using the same chemical language.84 
 
                                                 
 
83 In fact, it is rather surprising that patterns appear in this regard: these concepts are not fed into the 
model design—hence the difficulty of getting them out at the end—and yet model performance can 
often be neatly summarized in terms of these concepts. 
84 Not unlike the ‘productive ambiguity’ of the concept of the gene according to Keller (2002). 
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5.4.2  Concepts able to guide the development of more accurate and more interpretable 
computational models 
This dissertation has focused on the difficulty of recovering chemical concepts from computational 
models. However, this difficulty can be avoided if the chemical concepts are built into the 
computational model—that is, presumed in the very calculational procedure on which the model is 
based—and there are two distinct reasons they are sometimes so presumed. 
 
First, chemical concepts can guide the patchwork correction of empirical computational models. 
Model error is often articulated in terms of chemical concepts; for example, and as noted in the 
previous section, DFT-based approaches are known to be inaccurate for systems where dispersion 
interaction energy is important. If we are dealing with an empirical model, one where parameters are 
‘fit’ to match empirical data, then an interesting opportunity presents itself: we can augment the 
empirical model with parameters that are designed to capture this concept, and these parameters can 
then be fit to empirical data in way that, ideally, generalizes well (see Grimme, Ehrlich, and Goerigk 
2011 for an example focusing on dispersion corrected models). Interestingly, it is our traditional 
understanding of how the concept is supposed to work that suggests the structure of this 
parameterization, and so how to create more accurate empirical models. 
 
There is a second approach to designing computational models that focuses even more on traditional 
chemical concepts: ab initio valance bond theory (Raimondi et al. 1985; Shaik and Hiberty 2008). The 
idea here is that we have freedom in the way we approximate the Schrödinger equation, and we can 
spend this freedom to develop understandable models. Where most advances in computational 
modeling have added complexity to the way molecular orbitals are calculated, ab initio VBT seeks to 
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maintain local atomic orbitals and the host of intuitive concepts rooted therein (discussed in Chapter 
1). To overcome the poor accuracy of traditional VBT, flexibility is added to the behavior of the 
atomic orbitals (for example, see the 'breathing' atomic orbitals of: Hiberty et al. 1994; Hiberty and 
Shaik 2002). These modifications to atomic orbitals may modify the concepts based on them, but so 
long as their qualitative behavior remains intact, ab initio VBT offers a powerful tool for telling 
understandable stories in familiar terms (see Patil and Bhanage 2016 for a striking example). 
 
Note how strange this practice would appear to someone committed to the conceptual development 
of the rigor-driven camp. If our concepts ought to be cleanly and singularly rooted in physical theory, 
ab initio VBT represents a last-ditch effort to preserve a theoretical framework that physics has already 
told us to abandon. Or more poetically, these practices involve the positing of “parallel universes 
wherein [physical] laws are either ignored or ‘bent’ to accommodate personal points of view” (Bader 
2011). 
 
However, I hope to have offered a compelling alternative view of conceptual practices in the 
computational era, one where understanding takes a central, and sometimes even guiding role.  
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6.0 Conclusion 
I have shown that there is substantial and ongoing debate among theoretical chemists about the proper 
function of chemical concepts. Some theorists believe their primary function is to neatly summarize 
important elements of the underlying physical models, and others believe their primary function is to 
make simple qualitative patterns accessible.  
 
I elucidated the different strategies for conceptual development theorists of these respective camps 
adopt, and showed that the resulting concepts possess a variety of different features besides those that 
guide their development. Concepts developed by the rigor-driven camp are physically observable, but 
often impose changes to traditional conceptual behavior. Concepts developed by the understanding-
driven camp may make use of multiple quantification schemes in order to maintain consistency with 
the conceptual network in which they reside, and for this reason may lack a quantification with general 
significance.  
 
The presence of these conflicting modes of conceptual development means that philosophers of 
chemistry must be careful when drawing on chemical practice to fuel philosophical inquiries. 
However, it also offers several lines of philosophical investigation that are properly aligned with active 
concerns among chemists. Thus, I hope to have identified a promising direction for the future of 
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